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Faculty and Deans

The Federal Common Law of Crime
Robert C. Palmer

I. Introduction
The United States Constitution established a federal system, not a national
government. States continued necessarily and by design as active and
important centers of governmental activity. States were institutions of
inherent authority, while the federal government by original intentt and then
explicitly by amendment, 2 was a government of only delegated powers.
Since the federal government derived its power directly from the people and
acted directly on individuals, 3 it was decisively more powerful than the
pre-Constitution Confederation. 4 But the Bill of Rights 5 itself is evidence of
the continued worry, pervasive until modified by the Reconstruction
Amendments, 6 that the federal government might, but should not, overwhelm the states. 7
The federal courts, as courts of a government of delegated powers,
exercised specific jurisdictions. 8 Even the unamended Constitution confined
federal court jurisdiction, as with congressional powers, 9 to certain areas.to
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I. See Robert C. Palmer, 'Liberties as Constitutional Provisions, 1776-1791 ', (forthcoming) [hereinafter: Palmer, 'Liberties'].
2. U.S. Const. Amend X.
3. U.S. Const. Preface; James Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention E.H. Scott,
ed., (Freeport, 1970) 74,411,415.
4. Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Socialconstitutional History of the American Revolution 1776-1781 (Madison, 1940) 263-70.
5. U.S. Const., Amend. I-X.
6. U.S. Const., Amend. XIII-XV.
7. Palmer, 'Liberties', supra note I.
8. U.S. Const. Art. III.
9. U.S. Const. Art. I, §8.
10. U.S. Const. Art. III.
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A general jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters found no place there.
Those jurisdictions allotted to the federal courts served a federal purpose. 11
Historians and lawyers nevertheless agree that both legislators and federal
judges before 1800 consistently assumed that there was a federal common
law of crime. 12 That notion, if so universally current among policy makers
immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, would call into question
the limited nature of the federal government. Since the Constitution had not
delegated common law jurisdictions as such to the federal government, the
first generation would thus have assumed that certain matters pertained to
government, regardless of the constitutive document or the nature of the
government. The result might well be still only a federal government, but it
would be a federal government with powers quite difficult to define. The
history of the supposed federal common law of crime focuses attention on
the nature of the federal government and the federal system as originally
conceived.
The historiography of the federal common law of crime raises an equally
important although perhaps more parochial concern. Various modern
perceptions and convictions have interacted to obscure the nature of the task
of the historical investigation of legal and constitutional phenomena. The
first of these is the perception, grown into an obsession, that judicial
decision-making is not objective but is permeated by social policy bia~;es.
Judicial activity thus seems more like legislative activity. To some extent, of
course, the insight is a self-fulfilling prophecy. If judicial activity is seen as
indistinguishable from social policy legislation, then the judges' perception
II. Palmer, 'Liberties', supra note I.
12. Randall Bridwell and Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitution and the Common Law
(Lexington, 1977) 35-51; Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law,
1780·1860 (Cambridge, Mass., 1977) 9-11; Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two
Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and the Broken Promise of Federalist
Jurisprudence', 73 Northwestern University Law Review 26 (1978); Charles Warren,
'New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789', 37 Harvard Law
Review 49, 73 (1923); Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (New York, 1985)
275-79, 298; Leonard W. Levy, 'On the Origins of the Free Press Clause', 32
University of California at Los Angeles Law Review 177, 177-79, 208-11 (1984);
Stewart Jay, 'Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One', 133 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review llll-113 [hereinafter: Jay, 'Origins of Federal Common
Law']. There can be no dispute that there is, in a very limited sense, a federal common
law of crime: traditions of interpretation of constitutional criminal rights. As used here,
however, federal common law of crime refers to the existence of an inherent common
law authority rather than an express constitutional mandate for either the jurisdictional
grant or for the substantive law to be applied in criminal cases. Federal power within
the District of Columbia, while it was considered to include common law authority, is
distinct from other areas of the federal common law of crime. United State!; v.
Hammond, 26 F. Cas.96 (C.C.D.C. 1801)(No. 15,293); United States v. Lindsay. 26
F. Cas. 971 (C.C.D.C. 1805) (No. 15,602); United States v. Herbert, 26 F. Cas. 284
(C.C.D.C. I836)(No. 15,354); United States v. Crandell, 25 F. Cas. 684 (C.C.D.C.
1836)(No. 14,885) [seditious libel for distribution and publication of anti-slavery
pictures]. See George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, History of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Volume II: Foundations of Powers: John Marshall, 1801-15
(New York, 1981) 643-44 [hereinafter: Hist. S.C.].
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of their task alters and confirms the propriety of such judicial legislation.
The insight remains valid, however, even without that effect. The problem
it presents for historical investigation is that the emphasis on judicial
discretion and law-making capacity makes it seem unlikely to the sophisticated researcher that in the individual case judges were simply applying the
law: the precisely legal base of their activity then receives insufficient
attention.
A second modem perception has devalued constitutional language. As the
federal government has grown in the twentieth century, it has become
increasingly difficult to relate governmental structures and powers to the
original Constitution. Arguably, whether necessary or not, or desirable or
not, the federal government is operating outside the bounds permitted by the
Constitution. 13 But lawyers, judges, and historians, each with their own
interests, maintain the validity of the link to the eighteenth century
Constitution, ultimately deriving authority from some textual basis. But the
relationship is often tenuous. Explanations focus on the under-specificity of
constitutional language. 14 Constitutional language is often capable of
varying constructions. 15 But the way in which modem courts have redefined
words to justify seemingly necessary powers has made the task of constitutional construction very difficult and the meaning of constitutional
language problematic. The result for historical investigation is that historians talk about 'open-ended' provisions and decline to undertake analysis of
early constitutional ideas in relationship to various constructions of constitutional textual meanings. We talk more about 'constitutional ideas' or
'jurisprudence' 16 than we try to figure out how they derived their decisions
from the text. But this reluctance is misleading, for from the beginning
constitutional matters were decided formalistically . 17
The third modem notion is the importance of relating legal and constitutional history with social and political history. Doctrinal analysis undertaken
in isolation from the social and political context results not in history, but in
anachronism. More to the point, however, legal history will not contribute
to the general historical enterprise unless its specialists point out its
relevance and in an idiom understandable to historians generally. That

13. ThP. most striking instance is the extension of the interstate commerce power to the
conditions of manufacturing. While the appropriate boundaries of commerce are hard
to define, ordinary usage would never include everything now regulated as commerce.
14. For a convenient summary, see Frederick Schauer, 'An Essay on Constitutional
Language', 29 University of California at Los Angeles Law Review 797 (1982).
15. See Robert C. Palmer, 'The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: SlaughterHouse, Cruikshank, and the Fourteenth Amendment', 1984 University of Illinois Law
Review 739.
16. See Stephen B. Presser and Becky Bair Hurley, 'Saving God's Republic: the
Jurisprudence of Samuel Chase', 1984 University of Illinois Law Review 771; Jay,
'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12 at 1054-65.
17. See Morton J. Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, supra note 12 at 255-56.
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necessity, seriously accepted by modem legal historians, de-empha~;izes
technical arguments and directs attention away from the precisely legal
content of decisions and toward the social and political context. Legal and
constitutional history increasingly tends to devolve into explicating how the
law reflects various social movements. 18 That tendency ignores the doctrinal
side of the field which is the core of the intellectual and bureaucratic !igor
that makes the law something of a semi-independent force in society . 19
All three of these factors are valid and even pressing insights for the legal
historical venture. But they reinforce each other too greatly. If the judicial
enterprise is fundamentally legislative and bound to a judge's social policy
biases, then legal cases are merely political and are illustrative of general
political movements. If there is no set meaning to constitutional language,
then the meaning the courts ascribe to the words are not actually a following
of original intent, but the implementation of a political platform. And if one
accepts the realist notion of judicial activity and the dubiousness of arriving
at an 'objective' meaning of constitutional language, then the legal historian
easily talks the idiom of the general historian. In proper measure, all this is
not only acceptable but necessary.
The overemphasis on these insights has undercut historical creativity and
accuracy. A general historian could put a legal case in its social and political
context. The specific expertise of the legal historian should allow him to
construct the intellectual framework of the judges in relationship to the law.
The basic task is a rigorous analysis of the cases, attempting to understand
the document on its own terms. Without care for the individual case,. the
relevant context cannot be ascertained. In constitutional areas, the imperative question then is whether the cases can fit coherently into some
understanding of the Constitution. For the early period, the presumption
should be that they can. Social policy biases might explain why a particular
understanding of the language was more attractive. But personal convictions
and ulterior motives need not undermine the rigor of the decisions. Social or
political movements may indeed create a new context that will dictate an
alteration in constitutional constructio11, but so can prior legal determinations that create a different dialectic within the law itself. It should not be a
matter of dogma that changes are solely legal; neither should it be dogma
that legal changes are purely social. Only a foolhardy historian would
18. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (New York, 1973) 10 ('This
book treats American law, then, not as a kingdom unto itself, not as a set of rules and
concepts, not as a province of lawyers alone, but as a mirror of society. It takes nothing
as historical accident, nothing as autonomous, everything as relative and molded by
economy and society. This is the theme of every chapter and verse.') This extreme
view, increasingly characteristic of American legal history, contrasts sharply with
English legal history. See S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law
(Toronto, 2nd ed., 1981); Robert C. Palmer, 'The Feudal Framework of English Law',
79 Michigan Law Review 1130; Robert C. Palmer, The County Courts of Medieval
England, 1150-1350, (Princeton, 1982) 174-262.
19. Robert C. Palmer, The Whilton Dispute, 1264-1380: A Social-Legal Study of Dispute
Settlement in Medieval England (Princeton, 1984) 3-5, 210-20.
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maintain that politics played no role in judicial decisions; it should seem
similarly foolhardy to assume that doctrine played no role.
The historiography of the federal common law of crime presents just such
a problem. The commentators on the subject are learned; they are also
dedicated to searching out primary sources. 20 The defect is neither in
scholarly attainment nor dedication. Absorption with extensive research has
led to neglect of intensive documentary analysis and scant consideration of
textual constitutional justification for early constitutional decisions. In a
different way, the problem is even more simple and rests in the assumption
that legal opinions are easily understood. The assumption, once stated,
would always be rejected. But for a lawyer whose stock in trade is legal
analysis or for an historian of the law who consumes his life in reading
cases, mastery of the idiom produces an easy confidence in interpreting the
individual case. That confidence can produce myopia as well as breadth,
carelessness as well as originality.
This article is not an extensive study, but an intensive study that examines
the evidence for an early federal common law of crime and reconstructs the
constitutional basis of the early statutes and cases. The standard accounts of
the subject underlie much of my understanding of the cases and have proven
immensely helpful, but they remain deficient. The drafting of the Judiciary
Act of 178921 is normally taken to indicate that the first Congress believed
that there was a federal common law of crime. 22 Since seditious libel is a
common law crime23 and the First Congress likewise drafted the first
amendment, 24 the implications of that historical belief would affect speech
and press rights. 25 But the Judiciary Act demonstrates no such belief. Both
the drafting of the Act and the accompanying congressional debate indicate
that Congress mandated the federal courts jurisdiction over offenses under
the law of nations without any congressional authorization.26 This view
coincides with a strict construction of the Constitution;27 Congress directly

20. See Stephen B. Presser, 'Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12; Stewart Jay, 'Origins of
Federal Common Law', supra note 12; and Julius Goebel, Jr., History of the Supreme
Court of the United States:Volume 1. Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (New York,
1971) 625-33 [hereinafter: Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C.].
21. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, I United States Statutes at Large 73-93 [hereinafter:
Stats].
22. See supra note 12.
23. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 17-18.
24. U.S. Const. Amend I.
25. Levy, 'On the Origins of the Free Press Clause', supra note 12; David Anderson, 'The
Origins of the Press Clause', 30 University of California at Los Angeles Law Review
455; William T. Mayton, 'Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of
Expression', 84 Columbia Law Review 9!.
26. See text at notes 49-62 infra.
27. See text at notes 62-65 infra.
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mandated state, not federal, common law. 28 The first Congress did not
create, condone, or assume a federal common law of crime.
Like Congress, the federal courts did not assume the existence of a federal
common law of crime. They did not hesitate to punish offenses against the
law of nations not yet defined by Congress. In such matters, however, they
derived jurisdiction from the Constitution and from statute; and the law they
applied was state, not federal, common law. 29 Moreover, the federal
judiciary was sensitive to the problem of judicial legislation and referred
reflexively to state law-state constitutions and cases-in line with a ~:trict
understanding of the rules of decision clause of the Judiciary Act.3° Only
after Jay's term as chief justice did the problem of a federal common law of
crime properly surface. And only with Marshall was the rules of decision
clause narrowed to apply only in civil suits.3'
The claim that there was a federal common law of crime, when it did
arise, did not derive from the assumptions of 1789. Two cases altered the
judiciary's approach to federal jurisdiction. Wiscart v. Dauchy 32 made
derivation of any jurisdiction for federal circuit or district courts from the
Constitution suspect.3 3 Worrall 34 questioned the advisability of relying on
state law, focusing on the consequent inconsistency in federal court
practice.3 5 Given those two decisions, the judiciary could choose either to
follow a properly federal common law or else insist on federal statutes to
exercise those jurisdictions in which they had formerly relied on state law.
They chose to rely on federal statutes, so that the propriety of a federal
common law of crime, while not yet a dead-letter, was certainly dubious
prior to United States v. Hudson and Goodwin. 36
The early history of Congress and of the Judiciary provide no basis for a
federal common law of crime and thus no support for vast federal implied
powers that negate the notion of a limited federal government. Congress
dealt seriously with its constitutional mandate and was considerate of the
demands of federalism. Federal courts accepted and worked under the
mandates of the Judiciary Act and of the Constitution. The argument
concerning the federal common law of crime was the result of new problems
presented and old approaches ruled out.
The resolution was not in favor of common law, but rather an insistwce

28. See text at notes 187-93 infra.
29. See text at notes 170-86, 204-215 infra.
30. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §34; I Stats. 73, 93. See text at notes 187-200 infra.
31. See text at note 188 infra.
32. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
33. See text at notes 253-67 infra.
34. United States v. Worrall, 29 F. Cas. 774.
35. See text at notes 317-18 infra.
36. II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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on statutory authority. The emphasis on statutes explains the passage of the
Sedition Act, 37 itself unconstitutional: 38 there was agreement that a federal
common law was improper. But that insistence on statutes, while perhaps
jurisprudentially more satisfying, was not more constitutionally mandated
than the early reliance on state common law.

II. The Judiciary Act of 1789
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the federal court system. Since it
was the work of the First Congress, the Act, together with the congressional
debate surrounding its adoption, are the best post-ratification sources for
original intent relative to a federal common law of crime. Neither source
provides any evidence that Congress believed there was a federal common
law of crime. The evidence does indicate a constitutionally justifiable grant
over crimes under the law of nations not previously defined by statute. That
jurisdiction, however, is not equivalent to the assumption of a federal
common law of crime.
Sections 9 and 11 of the act are most relevant to common law criminal
jurisdiction; they provide for the jurisdiction of the federal district and
circuit courts. Section 9 states that 'the district courts shall have, exclusively
of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offenses that shall be
cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within their
respective districts, or upon the high seas' .39 Section 11 similarly gave
circuit courts authority over crimes and offenses 'cognizable under the
authority of the United States' .40
The working draft differs from the Judiciary Act in the crimes and
offenses subject to prosecution in the federal courts. 41 The draft gave the
federal courts a more limited jurisdiction. There, matters cognizable under
the authority of the United States had also to have been defined by law. The
appropriate portions of the draft read 'cognizable under the authority of the
United States and defined by the laws of the same' .42 The limiting clause
was removed during the process of legislative revision.
This alteration is indicative of intention, but such an historical deduction
is dangerous. Warren asserted that the only reasonable deduction was that
Congress disagreed with the original drafters and fully intended for the
district and circuit courts 'to take jurisdiction over common law crimes' .43
37. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, I Stats. 596.
38. David Anderson, 'The Origins of the Press Clause', supra note 25 at 521-23.
39. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§9 & II, I Stats. 73,76-77,78-79.
40. Ibid.
41. Charles Warren, 'New Light', supra note 12 at 49-51.
42. Ibid. at 73, 77.
43. Ibid. at 51, 73.
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He assumed that intention to have included crimes both at common law and
under the law of nations. 44 Bridwell and Whitten, although willing to
challenge Warren's other deductions from the draft bill, 45 agree that
Congress intended to give the courts jurisdiction over common law crimes
and admiralty. 46 Goebel took an opposing position, supposing that Congress
eliminated the limiting clause as redundant, since there was a bill4"1 in
progress to define crimes against the United States. 48 Nevertheless, the
omission of the clause most easily relates to a jurisdictional grant of crimes
not defined by Congress.
The conclusions drawn from the omission of the limiting clause in §9 and
§II , however, are overbroad. The draft bill and the Judiciary Act were not
drawn in a vacuum. The language certainly mandates a broad grant: of
undefined substantive law. One cannot conclude that Congress granted
jurisdiction over common law crimes along with judicial authority in the law
of nations.
The clause omitted in the final version of the act contained constitutional
language. The Constitution gave Congress the power '[t]o define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offenses against the
Law of Nations' .49 This clause is the only constitutional power to 'define'
and the only place at which the Constitution mentions 'offenses'. The
Constitution, for instance, delegates to Congress the power '[t]o exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever' for the seat of the govemment,50 '[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies' ,51 and to 'make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States' .52 But Article I, §8, cl.IO is the only power 'to define'.
The congressional committee probably consulted the Constitution in
44. Ibid. at 73, 77.
45. Randall Bridwell and Ralph Whitten, The Constitution and the Common Law, supra
note 12 at 38.
46. Ibid. at 38.
47. See Act of April 15, 1790, ch. 9, I Stats. 112-19.
48. Julius Goebel, Jr. Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 496. Presser points out that the meaning
of the word 'laws' in §34 of the Judiciary Act included statutory and common law and
that the word 'laws' in the limiting clauses in the draft of §9 and §II could logically
carry the same meaning (although it need not), so that the draft bill itself might have
carried the implication that there was a federal common law. Stephen B. Presser, 'Tale
of Two Judges', supra note 12 at note 170. That hypothesis is unlikely, primarily
because the limiting clause, referring to defining laws, seems more readily to refc:r to
statutes. As Presser's hypothetical language seems to indicate, there is no reason why
the word 'laws' would be used consistently in the Judiciary Act.
49. U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 10.
50. U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 17.
51. U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 4.
52. U.S. Const. Art. IV, §3, cl. 2.
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drawing up the Judiciary Act. The First Congress in other matters felt bound
by Constitutional language. 53 The clause 'and defined by the Laws of the
[United States]' most easily relates to the similar constitutional provision.
The wording of the clause in the draft bill suggests that the committee
intended to exert its definitional power over piracy and the law of nations
pursuant to Art. I §8, cl. 10. Its omission should perhaps indicate nothing
further.
The omission of the limiting clause could reasonably relate only to piracy
and the law of nations. Defining all offenses against the law of nations
would have been imprudent. The First Congress had to provide for duties on
imports (with their foreign policy implications) and for tonnage, 54 establishment of executive branch departments, 55 the collection of revenue and
the sale of territorial lands,56 compensation for governmental officials,
including the president, the justices, and themselves, 57 and Indian treaties. 58
They also had to debate the location of the permanent seat of government, 59
and submit the Bill of Rights to the states. 60 That was a substantial burden,
even without the establishment of the judiciary and its powers. The Senate
did provide for various offenses against the United States, including piracy
and those infractions of the law of nations incurred by offering violence to
public ministers. 61 While the definition of piracy was not onerous, a
53. Congress carefully debated the demands of constitutional language in establishing the
executive department as a whole and the Department of Foreign Affairs. I Annals
368-83, 455-585. Moreover, proper constitutional construction was debated. Ibid. at
461, 467, 473, 486, 503, 514, 536, 573-74, 829. In the consideration of the Judiciary
Act, the role of the state courts in enforcing the Constitution was the occasion for
construing the Constitution. Ibid. at 813-18.
54. I Annals 102-21, 123-42, 144-70, 173-231,234-47,251-65,271-318,324-28,330-66,
409-11,416,454-55,585-91,608-10,615-19. (Approximately thirty-three working
days.)
55. Ibid. at 368-97, 455-585, 590-608, 611-15, 619, 666-69. (Approximately fifteen
working days.)
56. Ibid. at 367-68, 411-24, 450-53, 619-32, 665-66. (Approximately twenty-one working
days.)
57. Ibid. at 232-3, 632-37, 643-58, 675-92, 785-86, 899-903. (Approximately twelve
working days.)
58. Ibid. at 687-703, 763-66. (Approximately four working days.)
59. Ibid. at 786-92, 835-87, 892, 895-98, 905-12, 920-27. (Approximately ten working
days.)
60. Ibid. at 248-51, 424-50, 660-65, 703-63, 766-78. (Approximately eleven working
days.) Miscellaneous matters, such as consideration of amendments to several different
bills, establishment of procedure, and various minor bills consumed approximately
another 28 days.
61. Ibid. at 834. The bill finally became law in the second session of the First Congress.
Act of April30, 1790, ch. 9, I Stats. 112-19. In that act, §§25-28 concern matters
under the law of nations, but the provisions speak about the law of nations as already
subsisting, citing merely various violations against that law. Legislation likewise
referred to the law of nations as a guide. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §13, I Stats.
at 80 ('And shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against
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definition of all offenses against the Jaw of nations would have been very
time-consuming.
Allowing the judiciary to punish offenses against the law of natrions
without prior congressional definition was congruent with constitutional
original intent. 62 The different phrasing of Article I, §8, cl. 10, 63 indicated
ambassadors ... as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of
nations.') Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §28, I Stars. at 118 ('That if any person shall
violate any safe-conduct or passport . . . or in any other manner infract the law
of nations, by offering violence to the person of an ambassador or other public:
minister . . . . ')Act. of March 3, 1819, §5, 3 Stats. 513. See also United States v.
Howard, 26 F. Cas. 390 (C.C.D. Pa. 1818)(No. 15,404); United States v. Chapel:;, 25
F. Cas. 399 (C.C.D. Va. 1819)(No. 14,782).
62. A Pennsylvania district attorney in 1806 argued this view, saying: 'The civil law being
considered, therefore, as the law of the admiralty, remains under the general delegation
of judicial power to the courts of the United States, unless it is expressly modified by
statute'. United States v. McGill, 26 F. Cas. 1088, 1089 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806)(No.
15,676). Justice Washington followed on with a comment that may have wider
implications but was properly concerned only with admiralty and offenses committed
on the high seas.
The judicial act gives jurisdiction to the circuit court, of 'all crimes and offences,
cognizable under the authority of the United States' .... There are, undoubtedly,
in my opinion, many crimes and offences against the authority of the Unit1:d
States, which have not been specially defined by law; for, I have often decided,
that the federal courts have a common law jurisdiction [note: not necessarily a
complete jurisdiction] in criminal cases: and in order to ascertain the authority of
the United States, independent of acts of congress, against which crimes may be
committed, we have been properly referred to the constitutional provision, that
'the judicial power shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdictior,·.
But still the question recurs, is this a case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
within the meaning of the constitution? The words of the constitution must be
taken to refer to the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of England . . . but no
case, no authority, has been produced to show, that in England such a prosecution
would be sustained . . . as a cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiciton . . . .
Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the present is a case omitted in the
law, and that the indictment cannot be sustained. It is some relief to my mind,
however, that I have no doubt of the power of congress to provide for such a case.
It is true, that it would be inconsistent with common law notions to call it murder;
but congress, exercising the constitutional power to define felonies on the high
seas, may certainly provide, that a mortal stroke on the high seas, wherever the
death may happen, shall be adjudged a felony.
Ibid. at 1090. Madison, writing during the ratification process of the Constitution,
thought that the definition of piracies 'might perhaps without inconveniency, be left to
the law of nations; though a legislative definition of them, is found in most municipal
codes. A definition of felonies on the high seas is evidently requisite.' The Federalisl
Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay No. 42 (New York,
1982). Madison's mild concern here related to felonies, only one portion of the Article
I §8, cl. 10 trilogy of piracies, felonies and offenses against the Law of Nations. See
also United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)(No.
15,551). See note 63 infra.
63. See text at notes 28-31 supra. Marshall's opinion was that the definitional power in
regard to piracy did not concern the law of nations. He argued that there were two kinds
of piracy. Piracy under the law of nations could neither be increased nor diminished by
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that the Constitutional Convention had not considered the federal courts
limited to operation by virtue of statutes. 64 The power to define was the
power to adjust, a power properly exercised only occasionally and not
always in advance of judicial action. The courts were possessed of admiralty
jurisdiction, but Congress could define in its own way the various crimes if
it felt the courts going awry. Apart from the wording, the First Congress was
sensitive not only to federalism but also to separation of powers concems. 65
an individual nation. But a nation could by legislative definition establish its own law
of piracy. This latter kind of piracy was, in his opinion, the subject of Article I, §8, cl.
10. '[T]his clause of the Constitution cannot be considered, as affecting acts which are
piracy under the law of nations.' I 0 Annals 607. See also ibid. at 599. Marshall at this
point was convinced of the constitutionality of the sedition laws. He reasoned that
'cases arising under the Constitution' must mean cases arising under the 'common or
unwritten law', which protected all governmental officials from libel. Since the judicial
power extended to that subject, he reasoned, Congress had the power to legislate to give
effect to that power. John Marshall, Address of the Minority in the Virginia Legislature
to the people of that state, containing a vindication of the constitutionality of the Alien
and Sedition laws (1799) 12. The inference from a court jurisdiction to a congressional
power is of course flawed. He also argued that the presence of the first amendment
indicated such a governmental power (ibid.), that punishing licentious publications was
not a restriction of the freedom of the press (ibid. at 13), and that 'the will of the
majority must prevail, or the republican principle is abandoned, and the nation is
destroyed'. Ibid. at 14. His reasoning on piracy is more respectable than his reasoning
on the first amendment.
64. After several alterations to federal court jurisdiction, the provision was altered to 'that
the jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the national laws; and to such
other questions as may involve the national peace and harmony'. Madison, Journal,
supra note 3 at 79. The dichotomy there between cases arising under national laws and
cases involving national peace and harmony indicate a non-statutory base for the latter.
That provision was then altered, not affecting that dichotomy: 'Resolved, That the
jurisdiction of the National Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws passed by
the General Legislature; and to such other questions as involve the national peace and
harmony.' Ibid. at 448. The report of the committee of detail, relating to the matters
that became Article I, §8, cl. 10, suggested: 'To declare the law and punishment of
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting
the coin of the United States, and of offences against the law of nations.' Ibid. at 454.
It is at least interesting that counterfeiting was here included with the law of nations
provisions and likewise formed one of the early problems. The final form can be seen
evolving later on. Ibid. at 705, 710, 759, 753.
65. For federalism, the most sensitive area was the role that the states would have in
enforcing the U.S. Constitution. I Annals 215, 797-833. In questions of citizenship,
state law was considered decisive. Ibid. at 404-08. Perhaps the most striking example
of the sensitivity of the First Congress to the rights of states was the refusal of the
Senate to concur in the proposed amendment to restrict states in the areas of religion,
speech and press, and trial practice originally proposed by Madison. Ibid. at 435. The
Judiciary Act as well as the succeeding provision for regulating the process of the
federal courts mandated a certain adherence to state law and practice. Act of Sept. 24,
1789, ch. 20, §§29 & 34, I Stats. 73, 88, 92; Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, §2, Ibid.
at 93-94. See also Charles Warren, 'New Light', supra note 6, 53-63; Julius Goebel,
Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 27 at 458,471, 473. See United States v. Coit, 25 F. Cas.
489 (D.C.D. N.Y. 1812)(No. 14,829) ('He shewed, not only from the acts of congress
particularly applicable to this subject, but from a view of the whole judiciary system of
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Congress was thus reluctant to intrude on other branches of government or
to shirk its own responsibilities. Congress did not debate the propriety of
delegating a legislative power to the judicial branch. Such a debate would
have been expected when considering the Judiciary Act §9 and § 11 had the
definitional power been considered a power necessarily exercised in advance
of judicial action.
Federal jurisdiction over piracy and the law of nations was the least
contentious jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts. Livermore stated that
the only reason why inferior federal courts should be established wa8 to
enforce the law of nations. Even so he would have preferred the state courts
to have functioned as the inferior federal courts. 66 Smith assumed agreement
in Congress to the law of nations jurisdiction: 'But to what objects do the
district courts extend? To admiralty causes and trials for piracy committed
on the high seas. Gentlemen have conceded that the district courts shall have
jurisdiction of these cases-to offences against the United States. ' 67 Smith
then extended such offenses to breaches of revenue laws and offenses
committed on the high seas. 68 Congressman Jackson, in arguing that state
courts could function as federal admiralty courts as they had prior to the
Constitution by congressional mandate, did not dispute the necessity for
having some kind of inferior court for such matters. 69 Thus, although
Congress debated institutional structure, they agreed on the federal character
of the law of nations.
Congress was unconcerned about federal court application of admiralty
and maritime law not congressionally defined. 70 Immediately after the
the United States, that it was the intention of congress to conform the proceedings of
the United States courts as nearly as possible to those of individual states respectively.'
Ibid. at 490.) For separation of powers, see note 53 supra.
66. I Annals, 797, 821. Livermore's primary objection was to the establishment of federal
inferior courts with jurisdiction other than admiralty/maritime/law-of-nations matters.
There is a certain amount of ambiguity in Livermore's speech that is clarified by
Smith's succeeding speech. Ibid. at 798, 800.
67. Ibid. at 799. Smith summarized Congress's position in a similar fashion:
But some gentlemen are of opinion that the district court should be altogeth•!r
confined to admiralty causes; while others deem it expedient that it should be
entrusted with a more enlarged jurisdiction; and should, in addition to admirahy
causes, take cognizance of all causes of seizure on land, all breaches of impost
laws, of offences committed on the high seas, and causes to which foreigners or
citizens of other States are parties. The committee are now to decide between the:;e
two opinions.
68. Ibid. at 799-800.
69. Ibid. at 831.
70. The concern about prior congressional definition can be considered either a federalism
or a separation of powers problem. Horwitz has noted the lack in the early days of a
separation of powers argument against the common law of crimes. He found the
federalism argument to be without foundation, citing James Sullivan. Horw.itz's
paraphrase of Sullivan is worth examining: 'James Sullivan of Massachusetts understood that the question of common law jurisdiction involved no special constitutional
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passage of the Judiciary Act, Congress passed 'An Act to regulate Processes
in the Courts of the United States', section 2 of which specified that 'the
forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity, and of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, shall be according to the course of the civil law' .71 To
the extent that form dictates substance or result, the act displayed no
reluctance to have the federal courts function like other admiralty courts.
Furthermore, in 1792 the second Congress modified the previous act to
allow for discretionary modifications by the inferior federal courts or
regulations provided by the Supreme Court. 72 Both the First and Second
Congress were content to allow the federal courts to work in admiralty law
without prior definition by Congress.
While Congress had no qualms about the Jaw of nations, the same was not
true in regard to the common Jaw. Congressman Baldwin remarked in the
second session of the First Congress that, although the several states had
adopted the common Jaw, 'we have not adopted the common law, and
therefore are free from its restraints'. 73 He concluded that Congress was not
affected by any common law rule excluding aliens from holding real
estate. 74 Baldwin's remark about the common law is not at odds with the
views of others in the First Congress.
Congressman Ames, however, made a remark about the common law that
might easily be misconstrued:
The branches of the judicial power of the United States are the admiralty jurisdiction, the
criminal jurisdiction, cognizance of certain common law cases, and of such as may be
given by the statutes of Congress. 75

'Certain common law cases' nevertheless, in terms denies a general
common Jaw jurisdiction. Article III powers necessitate handling certain
common Jaw matters under diversity jurisdiction. 76 Ames perhaps included
difficulties, for all that it required was that federal common law jurisdiction be limited
to those substantive crimes over which Congress had legislative power.' Sullivan made
that statement in 1801. Morton J. Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, supra
note 12 at 10. Sullivan's thought, however, was hardly that innocuous. In the same year
he wrote that the federal judiciary properly had criminal jurisdiction over anything
detrimental to the aims set forth in the Preface of the United States Constitution without
any statutory definition. James Sullivan, The History of Land Titles in Massachusetts
(New York, 1972, reprint of 1801 ed.) 344. Regardless of the thrust of Sullivan's
thought, that portion of Horwitz's analysis derives from writers in and after the year
1800 and thus not in the decisive first five years of the federal judiciary.
71. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, §2, I Stats. 93-94.
72. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, §2, I Stats. 276.
73. I Annals 1071. The debate at that point concerned whether or not an alien could hold
real estate situated in the United States.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid. at 807.
76. U.S. Canst. Art. III, §2, cl. I. Article III jurisdiction in diversity envisaged the
application of state law. Little thought had yet been given to the differences among the
common laws of the various states. It is thus wrong to say precisely that Congress
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foreign consuls as proper subjects of common law adjudication in federal
courts. 77 But neither Ames nor any other congressman said anything
indicating a belief in a general federal common law.
The First Congress assumed the lack of a federal common law. James
Madison, considering a contested election, argued that Congress should be
guided by the laws and constitution of the relevant state so far as they would
help, and only thereafter have recourse to general principles. 78 Richard Henry
Lee agreed. 79 The debate on the Judiciary Act was extended by a controv•;!rsy
over whether the state courts would serve as adequate inferior federal
courts. 80 Section 34 of the Judiciary Act directed the courts to follow ~:tat{:
law in trials at common law except where otherwise dictated by the Con··
stitution, treaties, or federal statutes. 81 And in the immediately succeeding
statute, the forms of writs and executions, with minor necessary exceptions,
were directed to be made in suits at common law 'in each state respectively
as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same'. 82 Just as
reference to admiralty law or the law of nations seemed sufficiently explicit
to avoid danger in the courts, so also did the direction to the federal courts
to follow state law. No one in the First Congress said anything that would
even contemplate the existence of a general federal common law.
A federal common law of crime is even less likely than a federal
common law in civil matters. The immediate implication of a federal
common law of crime would be seditious libel prosecutions. Leonard
Levy in 1960 argued that first amendment freedom of speech and press
was congruent with Blackstone's definition: 83 freedom from prior re-

mandated that federal courts apply state common law regardless of the inconsist·~ncy
that would entail. But the accommodations continually made for the states, the
legislative history of §34 of the Judiciary Act, and early practice indicate that
application of state common law was the closest response to congressional intent
possible. Charles Warren, 'New Light', supra note 12 at 86-88.
77. U.S. Const. Art. III, §2, cl. I; text at notes 228-35 infra.
78.
I take it to be a clear point, that we are to be guided, in our decision, by the laws
and constitution of South Carolina, so far as they can guide us; and where the laws
do not expressly guide us, we must be guided by principles of a general nature, :;o
far as they are applicable to the present case.
I Annals 404.

79. 'If the laws of that State recognised him as [a citizen], the question was determined,
because this House could not dispute a fact of that kind.' Ibid. at 403.
80. See text supra at notes 66-69 supra.
8 I. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, §34, I Stats. 92.
82. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, §2, I Stats. 94.
83.
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and ·not in freedom
from censure for criminal matter when published.
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straint. 84 Prosecutions for abuse of the freedom would thus have been
acceptable under original intent. He has only altered his opinion marginally
since then. 85 Both David Anderson86 and William Mayton, 87 in different
ways, have argued for a broader definition of the original intent that
encompasses also the prohibition of subsequent punishment. Anderson's
and Mayton's conclusions are nearer the truth in that federalism concerns
made such prosecutions very worrisome.88
Two incidents in the First Congress demonstrate congressional opposition
to seditious libel prosecutions; they are indicative of the congressional
stance on a federal common law of crime. The first incident was Congressman Jackson's opposition to a federal bill of rights. As a Georgian, he was
concerned with federal assistance against the Indians. 89 He favored a strong
federal government. Jackson spoke immediately after Madison submitted

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. (Oxford, 1765-69)
iv, 151.
84. Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early
American History (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) 247-48.
85. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 272-76, 281. In his
revision, Levy altered his analysis of the Senate's revisions to the extent that he thinks
now that the Senate did not want to limit the meaning of freedom of the press to its
common law meaning. Ibid. at 262; Leonard Levy, 'On the Origins of the Free Press
Clause', supra note 6 at 203n. Levy argues nevertheless that the meaning of 'freedom
of the press' is Blackstonian, and that only the phrase 'Congress shall make no law'
gives the first amendment a wider meaning. That wider meaning, however, is only a
restriction against Congress; the judiciary would be free to operate under the common
law of crime to prosecute seditious libellers. Levy, of course, would prefer that the
judiciary leave that past behind. See David M. Rabban, 'The Ahistorical Historian:
Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History,' 37 Stanford Law
Review 795 (1985).
86. David Anderson, 'The Origins of the Press Clause', supra note 25. Anderson's thesis
leads to the conclusion that the press is by original intent a fourth branch of the
governmental structure, such that it can have appendant rights. The validity of his
argument depends on an identity of meaning between state and federal provisions for
freedom of the press.
87. William T. Mayton, 'Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of
Expression', 84 Columbia Law Review 91. Mayton's thesis is that the first amendment
was superfluous and damaging, since the Treason clause was adequate for the purpose
of protecting expression. His argument rests on the dubious proposition that the
protection against seditious libel, a misdemeanor, can be derived from the Treason
clause, which concerns a felony. Levy has attacked that article, justifiably, but without
recognizing the substantial contribution it made. Leonard Levy, 'The Legacy Reexamined', 37 Stanford Law Review 767 (1985).
88. See Robert C. Palmer, 'Liberties,' supra note I.
89. Merill Jensen, ed., The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, 14
vol. (Madison, 1978) iii, 287-89. Georgia's cooperation with the federal government
did not last much longer than the first session of the First Congress. Ibid. at 285-90.
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his proposed amendments. 90 Nevertheless, Levy, Anderson, and Mayton do
not discuss his speech.9t
Jackson argued against the proposed amendments. Since liberty of the
press was not being threatened, he said, it needed no further protection. He
noted that the press had attacked a congressman recently, but that Congress
had not prosecuted the paper for the attack, even though the Constitution
would have permitted it. 92 The constitutional provision he referred to was
the speech or debate clause, 93 which prior to the first amendment would
have permitted prosecutions for breach of privilege in the nature of seditious
libel, but only for libels against Congress, not the executive. 94 Jackson's
90. Madison submitted his proposed amendments on 8 June 1789. I Annals 431-44·2.
Jackson, firm in his opposition to consuming time in making amendments to an as yet
unproved Constitution, immediately opposed them. Ibid. at 442-44.
91. Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression, supra note 84; Leonard Levy, Emergence of a
Free Press, supra note 12; Leonard Levy, 'On the Origins of Free Press Clause', supra
note 12; David Anderson, 'The Origins of the Press Clause', supra note 25 [despitt: a
passing mention in a footnote, p. 522]; William T. Mayton, 'Seditious Libel and the
Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression', supra note 25. The lack of discussion is
even more perplexing in that the speech is also included in the standard collection of
documents relating to the origins of the Bill of Rights. Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of
Rights: A Documentary History, 2 vols. (New York, 1971) ii, 1034-36. Konvitz quoted
a large portion of Jackson's speech, stopping before Jackson's reference to the
Constitution, but did not analyze it. Milton R. Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a
Free People: Religion, Speech, Press, Assembly (Westport, 1957) 352. Levy, at least,
seems to assume that there is little left in the legislative history, since he relies heavily
on the fact that no one in the last twenty-five years has found more than he had. Leonard
Levy, 'On the Origins of the Free Press Clause,' supra note 12 at 203n. The appropriate
place for him to have analyzed Jackson's speech omits the speech entirely. Leonard
Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 258-60.
92.
The gentleman endeavors to secure the liberty of the press; pray how is this in
danger? There is no power given to Congress to regulate this subject as they can
commerce, or peace, or war. Has any transaction taken place to make us suppose
such an amendment necessary? An honorable gentleman, a member of this House,
has been attacked in the public newspapers on account of sentiments delivered on
this floor. Have Congress taken any notice of it? Have they ordered the writer
before them, even for a breach of privilege, although the Constitution provides that
a member shall not be questioned in any place for any speech or debate in the
House? No, these things are offered to the public view, and held up to the
inspection of the world .... Where, then, is the necessity of taking measures to
secure what neither is nor can be in danger?
I Annals 442-43.
The regulation Jackson mentioned as outside congressional power would have been
legislative action; congressional enforcement of the speech and debate clause would
have been by breach of privilege prosecutions.
93. U.S. Const. Art. I §6, cl. I. ' ... and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
shall not be questioned in any other Place.'
94. In state constitutions somewhat similar language appears that is compatible with
Jackson's construction of U.S. Const. Art I, §6, cl. I. The Massachusetts Consritution
of 1780, Art. 21 provided in its Declaration of Rights that:
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argument supposed that liberty of the press required more than the absence
of prior restraint: that subsequent punishment would likewise infringe the
liberty of the press. Liberty of the press was clearly one of the major
demands for amendment made during the ratification debates. 95 Jackson's
unchallenged statements about liberty of the press are one indication of a
broad understanding of freedom of the press in the First Congress.
A second incident similarly indicates a broad understanding of freedom of
the press and a presumption against a common law of crime. Toward the end
of the first session of the First Congress, Congressman Burke attempted to
censure the press. He alleged that those who had been allowed to sit 'at the
very foot of the Speaker's chair' to record the debate in the House had
misrepresented, distorted, and partially suppressed whole arguments, thus
reflecting 'upon the House a ridicule and absurdity highly injurious to its
privileges and dignity' .96 The resolution further noted that such reporting
infringed freedom of debate, referring to the speech or debate clause.97 He
brought his resolution forward after the House had finished with the Bill of
Rights, but before the states had ratified it. 98 In the succeeding short debate

The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of the legislature,
is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any
accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other court or place
whatsoever.
William Swindler, ed., Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions, 10 vols.
(Dobbs Ferry, 1973-79) v, 95. The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, Art. 30 is
almost identical to that of Massachusetts, except that it omitted the word 'accusation'.
Ibid. at ix, 347. Vermont, not confederated yet with the other states, adopted the
Massachusetts provision verbatim, modifying the language only to accommodate its
unicameral legislature. The provision appears in the 1786 Vermont Constitution, ch. I,
Art. 16. Ibid. at ix, 499. The Georgia Constitution of 1789, Art. I, §14 provided
somewhat different language: 'Nor shall any member be liable to answer for anything
spoken in debate in either house, in any court or place whatsoever.' Ibid. at ii, 453.
Georgia, it should be remembered, was Jackson's home state. No other state had an
independent speech and debate clause; the Pennsylvania provision of 1790 Art. I, § 17
('questioned in any other place') was probably borrowed from the federal constitution.
It seems at least arguable that inclusion of the word 'accusation' and the specification
of 'any other place' in addition to courts would legitimate breach of privilege
prosecutions. In states, the rationale would be clear. The primary liberty was a
republican form of government, for which the representatives had to be free to express
themselves. That same consideration explains why the provision appeared in declarations of rights, instead of in the structural sections of state constitutions. For a complete
discussion of these problems, see Robert C. Palmer, 'Liberties', supra note I.
95. David Anderson, 'The Origins of the Press Clause', supra note 25 at 467-75.
96. I Annals 917.
97. Ibid.; U.S. Const. Art. I, §6, cl. I.
98. The House completed work on the Bill of Rights on September 24, two days before the
question of the reporting came up. I Annals 913-14. The Senate did not complete
consideration of the amendments until September 25. Ibid. at 87-88. The amendments
were not sent to the states until October 2, 1789. Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights,
supra note 91 at ii, 1171.
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the two remedies suggested were that the reporters be removed from their
position at the Speaker's chair into the gallery, thus to parallel the British
system, 99 or the passage of a motion that debate be reported accurately and
impartially. 100 The remedies for the grievance were obviously mild, but
were still not acceptable. Congressman Hartley objected to Burke's resolution as an attack on the liberty of the press. 101 Lee, Madison, and White
spoke against any motion that would approve the reporting of the debates,
because the reports would then seem to be official publications and the
reporters perhaps subject to congressional action . 102 They preferred that the
reporters continue to function with the tacit consent of Congre~:s. 103
Everyone expressed approval for the dissemination of information; and in
short order the debate terminated with the withdrawal of all motions. 104
The issue resurfaced the following session. The reporters had mt!ekly
responded to the criticism levelled at them previously by sitting in the
gallery. 105 Congressman Page raised the issue, wanting to reassure: the
reporters that they were welcome and noted the possible repercussions if the
House seemed to censure the reporters . 106 Other congressmen supported the
reporters, although not wanting to give official sanction to the reporting. No
one opposed the reporters resuming their position near the Speaker's
chair. 107 Despite the hurt feelings aroused by misrepresentations, the
opinion in Congress was that liberty of the press, shaped by federal
concerns, dictated freedom both from prior restraint and from subsequent
punishment. Even non-penal restraints seemed excessive.
The First Congress could hardly have meant to give the federal courts
jurisdiction over the common law of crime. Congressman Baldwin asserted
explicitly that the federal government had not adopted the common law. 108
Legislation consistently referred the courts to state statutory and common
law, as rules of decision. 109 Moreover, Congress was even sensitive about
breach of privilege powers granted by Article I, §6, cl. 1. The omission of

99. I Annals, 918.
100. Ibid. at919.
101. 'Congressman Hartley wished a decision on the motion. He contemplated the question
as involving in it an attack upon the liberty of the press.' Ibid.
102. Ibid. at 919-20.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid. at 920.
105. Ibid. at 1059.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid. at I059-61.
I08. I Annals I071 . For Madison's similar view, see his 1787 letter to George Washington
reprinted in Joseph H. Smith, Cases and Materials on the Development of Legal
Institutions, (St. Paul, 1965) 520.
109. See text at notes 81-82 supra.
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the limiting clause in §9 and § 11 of the Judiciary Act cannot indicate
congressional intent to delegate to the courts criminal common law as well
as the law of nations. The First Congress did not assume that there was a
federal common law of crime.

III. Federal Practice Before Wiscart
The early federal judiciary, like Congress, did not espouse a federal
common law of crime. Stephen Presser has often maintained that they
did.IIO Morton Horwitz presumes that the justices exercised federal common
law jurisdiction in criminal matters. 111 Leonard Levy thought that that was
the early understanding 112 even before he began to cite Presser as an
authority. 113 Stewart Jay only recently has similarly maintained that federal
justices presumed a federal common law of crime. 114 Early federal cases
nevertheless demonstrate a decent regard for original intent. The federal
courts willingly applied the law of nations powers delegated to them, 115 but
showed little inclination to expand that grant of power into a complete
acceptance of the common law of crime. Offenses committed against the
law of nations presented no special problems. Congress had given the
federal courts jurisdiction over offenses against the law of nations without
prior definition. 116 Even if the justices were unfamiliar with the legislative
history of the Judiciary Act, they could conclude as much from the act itself.
And those matters mentioned in Article 1, §8 undoubtedly fell under the

110. Stephen B. Presser, Studies in the History of the United States Courts of the Third
Circuit (Washington, 1982) 26-37; 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 26-109;
Stephen B. Presser and Jamil S. Zainaldin, eds., Law and American History: Cases and
Materials (St. Paul, 1980) 188-207; Stephen B. Presser and Becky Bair Hurley,
'Saving God's Republic: The Jurisprudence of Samuel Chase', 1984 University of
Illinois Law Review 771, 796-97.
Ill. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, supra note 12
at 9-15.
112. Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression, supra note 84, 236-41. The origins of Levy's
advocacy of this view might be found in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in a
case concerning mere advocacy of sedition. Frankfurter explained the first amendment
by reference to early state prosecutions for seditious libel and state formulations of the
speech and press rights. Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494, 519-23 (1950). Justice
Brennan in 1957 reiterated the Frankfurter view of the original intent behind the first
amendment in the context of an obscenity case. Roth v. United States; Albert v. State
of California, 354 U.S. 476, 482-84. Levy received encouragement from Frankfurter
in the course of his investigations. Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression, supra note 84
at xiii.
113. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 275n.
114. Stewart Jay, 'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12.
115. See text at notes 54-61 supra.
116. Ibid.
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cognizance of the authority of the United States. Both piracy and offenses
against the law of nations were thus cognizable.
The problem concerns the nature of the federal government. Had the
federal and state governments been alike, the federal government would
have been a government of inherent authority, capable of acting as required
and of receiving or having by nature the common law. The acceptance of
such a federal government would lead readily to the importation of an
extensive list of crimes developed in a much more aristocratic society,
including seditious libel. That result would be a departure from the
assumptions on which the federal Constitution was built 117 and a violation of
the rule established explicitly in the tenth amendment. 118 On the other hand,
recognition of the federal government as a government of delegated powers
allows exercise of all delegated powers to their fullest extent without
contravention of original intent. The traditional line of cases cited in favor
of the former position actually shows the latter.

A. Jay's Charge to the Grand Jury: 1790
The earliest indication that federal courts would apply the law of nations
without specific congressional definition-no indication of a general federal
common law-involved Chief Justice Jay in 1790. Jay charged the grand
jury for the Eastern Circuit to present offenses against the United States. 119
He wanted the grand jurors to consider the law of nations, federal statutes
concerning revenue, and misconduct by federal officers. His remarks have
been exaggerated to reveal a belief in a general federal common law .1 20
Jay first spoke on the law of nations. He spoke broadly to instruct the
jurors. 121

117. William T. Mayton, 'Seditious Libel', supra note 25 at 117-19. Mayton assert~: here
that 'an understanding was reached at the convention and during the ratification process
that the national government had no power over speech'. Ibid. at 118. The unden;tanding reached was that the federal government ought to have no power over speech, but
that as the Constitution stood it might have. Had everyone been content that the
Constitution actually allowed no power over speech or press, the amendment would not
have been necessary. Mayton does not treat the Article I, §6, cl. I problem. See text
at notes 92-93 supra.
118. U.S. Const. Amend. X.
119. Henry P. Johnston, ed., The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, 4 vols.
(New York, 1971) iii, 387-95.
120. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 48-51. This analysis is excerpted in
Presser and Zainaldin, Law and American History, supra note 110 at 188-91.
121. Henry P. Johnston, Public Papers, supra note 119, at iii, 393. Presser's excerpt in his
article omits the first sentence here, which mentions precisely the laws of the United
States. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 48. That omission
might affect the, analysis. Omitting the passage would be reasonable if 'laws of the
United States' were taken to include statutory and common law. If one takes that phrase
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The objects of your inquiry are all offences committed against the Jaws of the United
States in this district, or on the high seas, by persons now in the district. You will
recollect that the Jaws of nations make part of the Jaws of this, and of every other
civilized nation. They consist of those rules for regulating the conduct of nations
towards each other, which, resulting from right reason, receive their obligation from that
principle and from general assent and practice.

Presser concluded that thus 'the jurors were to use their own common sense
and their knowledge of world and national history ... to search for criminal
acts' .122 Stewart Jay noted that Jay's comments on the law of nations were
the assertions that would later constitute 'the centerpiece of nonstatutory
prosecutions' . 123 Both Presser and Stewart Jay thus consider that Jay gave
the jury an unbounded, discretionary authority for indictment.
Jay's charge was much more reasonable. The law of nations was not
strictly codified. Blackstone, however, had maintained that it consisted of
three subjects: violations of safe-conducts, infringement on the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy . 124 The inclusion of piracy as part of the law of
nations was particularly important for Jay's charge, because two of the
people to be indicted were arrested on suspicion of piracy. 125 Moreover, the
law of nations had been the subject of sophisticated treatises already,
including the treatises of VatteP 26 and Puffendorf, 127 both of which were
cited by contemporary American lawyers. 128 Jay's charge hardly released
the grand jury into the vast realms of world and national history and
common sense.
The alleged pirates were convicted, but there is no report of the argument.
Jay did proceed in the case, even though the Act for the Punishment of
certain Crimes against the United States, being considered at the time, had
not yet passed Congress. 129 That Jay allowed the conviction, however,
indicates his belief in the court's authority under the law of nations. His
to include both statutory Jaw and the Constitution, however, a completely different
conclusion results.
122. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 48.
123. Stewart Jay, 'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12 at 1040. He has
investigated likewise other justices' charges. Wilson and Iredell included citations to
statutes in their charges, although Wilson accepted law of nations powers. Jay,
however, presumes that all nonstatutory prosecutions are alike. He does not consider
the difference that Article III admiralty powers together with Article I §8, cl. 10 law of
nations authority would make.
124. William Blackstone, Commentaries, supra note 83 at 68.
125. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 622-23.
126. Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature, applied
to the conduct and affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (Philadelphia, 1817). This volume
was a translation of Vattel's posthumous 1773 edition. Ibid. at iii.
127. Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations (Oxford, 1703). This was an
English translation.
128. United States v. Henfield, II F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) 1117.
129. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 622.
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ideas were probably similar to those used later in Henfield, 130 and irrelevant
for a general federal common law.
The second area of concern for the grand jury was federal statutes. Jay
thus charged the jury that:
The penal statutes of the United States are few and principally respect the revenue.
The right ordering and management of this important business is very essential to the
credit, character, and prosperity of our country. On the citizens at large is placed the
burthen of providing for public exigencies. Whoever therefore fraudulently withdraws
his shoulder from the common burthen necessarily leaves his portion of the weight to be
born by the others, and thereby does injustice not only to the government, but to them. 131

Presser asserts that Jay emphasized the shirking, thus expanding the jury's
consideration from only the revenue statutes to any offense resulting from an
individual shirking his duties. 13 2 Jay's comments are again unobjectionable.
He referred to the revenue statutes and then exhorted the jury to indict for
their contravention. A jury might have needed some exhortation to indict a
fellow state citizen for a federal offense: reminding them of the additional
burden such offenses put on everyone else was an appropriate exhortation.
Moreover, this interpretation of Jay's charge in 1790 corresponds nicely to
Jay's charge written in 1793 for the grand jury in Richmond, Virginia. 133
There he stated that 'The Constitution, the statutes of Congress, the laws of
nations, and treaties constitutionally made compose the laws of the United
States' . 134 He then mentioned the revenue statutes and went on to explain
why infractions of the statutes should be presented, explaining the nece:;sity
for preserving good public credit. 135
· In both form and substance, Jay was merely doing his duty. Propliety
allowed a judge to exhort a grand jury to indict wrongdoers fearlessly, fully,
and honestly. 136 Moreover, Jay's remarks in substance were no more
130. See note 62 supra; text at notes 170-93 infra. John Marshall, arguing in Congress in
1800, maintained not only that piracy, as part of the Jaw of nations, was neces~:arily
under the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of Article III, but also that the federal
courts could properly have taken cognizance of such cases absent a statutory mandate.
10 Annals 614. Marshall perceived the Jaw of nations as having something of an
independent standing. Ibid. at 607.
131. Henry P. Johnston, Public Papers, supra note ll9 at iii, 394.
132. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 49.
133. Henry P. Johnston, Public Papers, supra note 119 at iii, 478-85. A different charge to
the same grand jury has survived. 11 F. Cas. 1099, supra note 128 at 1099-105. That
charge is prefaced to the Henfield case. Goebel believed that the latter charge was the
one actually delivered to the grand jury. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20
at 623n. The former charge is here used because the charge as actually delivered
reversed the order of consideration, so that Jay, apologizing for the length of his charge,
merely mentioned but did not comment on the revenue statutes.
134. Henry P. Johnston, Public Papers, supra note 119 at iii, 479.
135. Ibid. at 479-80.
136. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 620-21.
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offensive than Madison's remarks in the First Congress: 'A man who
wounds the honor of his country by a baseness in defrauding the revenue,
only exposes his neighbors to further and greater impositions.' 137 Neither
Jay nor Madison need to be construed as exhorting action outside the areas
in which the courts had statutory definitions.
The final segment of Jay's charge to the 1790 jury concerned the
misdeeds of federal officers. The jurors were to 'direct your attention also to
the conduct of the national officers, and let not any corruptions, frauds,
extortions or criminal negligences, with which you may find any of them
justly chargeable, pass unnoticed' . 138 Presser asserts that Jay thus allowed
the jury to indict for 'virtually any examples of wrongdoing against the
government or the public' . 139 Since this part of the charge obviously
concerned only governmental officials, Presser backed away marginally in
a later version by bracketing in the comment 'at least as committed by
government officials' . 140 But the charge concerned only governmental
officials. Even the revised commentary stretched to make a point. Jay's
charge is no indication of a general federal common law of crime. 141 That
Presser was unable to find any contemporary criticism of Jay's charge is
hardly surprising. 142
Jay had not referred to statutory authority for prosecutions of official
misconduct. 143 Presser finds in that an indication of a belief in common law
authority. But a justice, in the opening exhortation to the grand jury, need
not recite statutes: that would be the prosecutor's job. 144 Had there been no
statutes under which to prosecute governmental officials, a justice's encouragement to prosecute would be a problem. But some statutes did provide
penalties for official misconduct. 145 In regard to the law of nations, of
137. I Annals 199.
138. Henry P. Johnston, Public Papers, supra note 119 at iii, 394.
139. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 49.
140. Stephen B. Presser and Jamil S. Zainaldin, Law and American History, supra note
110 at 189.
141. Presser goes rather beyond Goebel in evaluating Jay's charge. Goebel merely noted that
Jay did not advance any specific argument for law of nations offences. Julius Goebel,
Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 622-23.
142. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 48n.
143. Ibid. at 49.
144. But see Stewart Jay's examination of the practice of other justices. See text at notes
204-15 infra.
145. The 'Act to regulate the Collection of the Duties imposed by law on the tonnage of
ships or vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandises imported into the United
States' provided for collectors, naval officers, and surveyors. Act of July 31, 1789, ch.
5, 1 Stats. 29. An oath was prescribed, with a forfeiture of $200 for 'failure herein',
the failure being either the failure to take the oath or the failure to perform duties
faithfully. Ibid. at §8. The collectors were required to enter into a substantial bond,
ranging fro'!! $50,000 to $1,000. Any breach of the conditions entailed forfeiture. Ibid.
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course, Jay would not have been worried about the lack of a statute. 146 J[n his
charge, it is possible to argue that Jay only performed his proper functions.
If it seems that the charge as to officials was somewhat broader than the
statutory base, belief in a federal common law of crime is not the necessary
deduction. The justices were cognizant of popular concern about federal
tyranny. A sermon decrying federal official corruption would serve a
political purpose, even if it resulted in indictments that failed for la·::k of
legal authority. However that portion of Jay's charge is to be characterized,
it does not coincide with the conclusions of Presser and Stewart Jay. Jay's
charge to the grand jury in 1790 is irrelevant to the proposition that early
federal justices believed in a federal common law of crimes, except
concerning the law of nations. 14 7

B. Benfield's Trial

In May 1793 Gideon Henfield, an American citizen, acting as prize master
on a French ship took possession of a British ship captured on the high seas.
He brought the British ship as a prize to Philadelphia. 148 At the time B:ritain
and France were at war. The United States was determined to stay neutral,
at §28. Criminal conviction may have been proof of breach, but may have entailed no
further punishment. The various officers were likewise required to set up openly a table
of fees and duties, failure to do which resulted in a forfeiture of $100. Ibid. at §29. A
demand for excessive fees or other rewards resulted in a forfeiture of $200, although
solely to the use of the party aggrieved. Ibid. at §29. Query if such a failure would
result in forfeiture of the bond. Such officers who received a bribe or connived at .1 false
entry forfeited not less than $200 nor more than $2000 for each offence and entailed
disablement from office. Ibid. at §35. See also William Blackstone, Commentaries,
supra note 83 at iv, 303-07. The 'Act for Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regulating
the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes' provided similar penalties, but without an
informer provision, for making false registry, taking excessive fees, rendering false
descriptions of vessels, or mere neglect of duty. Act of Sept. I, 1789, ch. II, !i34, I
Stats. 55, 64-65. The act that established the Treasury Department prohibited treasury
officers from self-interested or conflicting obligations, contravention of which was a
high misdemeanor punishable by fine, removal from office, and disablement of office,
with informers, if any, receiving half the forfeiture. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, §8,
I Stats. 65, 67.
146. See text at notes 129-30 supra.
147. A constitutional construction that allowed prosecution under the law of nations without
a statutory base proves nothing about ordinary common law crimes. The doctrine that
dictated that jurisdiction could not be exercised without a statute further defining the
crime and the penalty began later. See text at notes 276-80 infra. The result of thPJ later
conclusion was the possibility of a grant of jurisdiction that could not be exercised: not
necessarily a desirable situation.
148. Henfield, II F. Cas. at 1116. Leonard Levy's discussion of Henfield is supe1ficial.
Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, su.pra note 12 at 276. Stewart Jay's
discussion of Henfield is mostly contextual, as if the surrounding politics provided the
meaning of the case. Stewart Jay, 'Origins of the Federal Common Law', supra note
12 at 1042-53. His discussion adds nothing to Presser's treatment.
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despite strong domestic feelings in favor of France because of the perceived
similarity at that time between the American Revolution and the French
Revolution. 149 Henfield was indicted in federal court for offenses against the
law of nations and under United States treaties. Henfield is the earliest case
normally cited as proof of the early judiciary's belief in a federal common
law of crime. 150
Henfield was a criminal prosecution at common law, although not at
federal common law. Justice Wilson, in his charge to the grand jury, talked
about the common law, 'as now received in America' . 151 Since the common
law associated other laws to it, the common law incorporated the law of
nations. The law of nations regulated the relations of nations, and thus
indispensably to a certain degree the conduct of a nation's citizens. A citizen
who took it upon himself to wage war was in violation of the law of nations
and thus in violation of the common law . 152 Wilson did not talk about
'United States common law' as distinct from state common law: his
language, from our perspective, was vague, as if referring to a single system
of law. He was confident that no statute was necessary to prosecute
Henfield.
Henfield's prosecutors were Attorney General Randolph and District

149. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20, 624-25.
150. Ibid. at 623; Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 276. Leonard
Levy's earlier citation of a counterfeiting case rested on a misdated case, the date of
which was revised only later by Goebel. Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression, supra
note 84 at 239-40; text at note 282 infra. Presser, of course, finds a substantial problem
with Jay's 1790 charge to the grand jury. See text at notes 119-47 infra.
151. II F. Cas. at I 106. The statement is not equivalent to an assertion that the federal
government has received the common law.
152. Ibid. at 1107-108. Wilson was unlikely to derive a jurisdiction directly from the
common law. In December 1787, at the convention in Pennsylvania to ratify the federal
constitution, Wilson got into an argument about federal prosecution of libels, the focal
point for jurisdiction in strictly criminal common law areas. The argument there
centered on what would happen if Congress made a statute to prosecute libels; Wilson
first argued that Congress had no such power. Then, to answer the question directly, he
maintained that, 'even if it had the power to make laws on this subject', the accused was
no worse off than under the state government. Merril Jensen, ed., Documentary
History, supra note 89 at ii, 454-55. That argument would be perplexing if they were
arguing about a disputed power in Congress to do what everyone thought the federal
courts could do anyway. The natural conclusion is that both Wilson and the
anti-federalists were here assuming that the courts had no jurisdiction derived strictly
from common law, but might receive specific powers from congressional legislation.
See David Anderson, 'Origins of the Press Clause', supra note 25 at 504; William T.
Mayton, 'Seditiou~ Libel', supra note 25 at 180n. Leonard Levy, rejecting the analysis
of both Anderson and Mayton indicating that Wilson was speaking hypothetically,
simply cannot have re-read the whole passage. Levy first says that Wilson assumed the
existence of federal court power to prosecute seditious libel, then, in the same
paragraph, talks about his assertion of the same proposition. Leonard Levy, Emergence
of a Free Press, supra note 25 at 240-41. Wilson's argument neither assumed nor
asserted that proposition, except in relation to state governments.
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Attorney William Rawle. 153 Randolph thought the common law was
involved. In his official capacity he advised the Secretary of State that
Henfield could be prosecuted. Henfield had violated United States treaties
that were legally binding on citizens; but he was also indictable at common
law, because his actions disrupted the peace of the United States. 154 Like
Jay, Randolph was not specific about whose common law would be used.
Randolph had examined the common law in 1790, reporting to Congress
on the Judiciary Act. He believed then that the United States had adopted the
common law to the extent of using it to explain terminology in state and
federal statutes and to handle cases that arose within a particular state. 155 He
considered any further relationship to the common law unsure and thought
that the ambiguity should be resolved by adopting the common law a!; the
rule of decisions insofar as it was not discordant with the Constitution,
federal statutes, or the laws of the several states. 156 Even in his suggested
scheme, however, state law would be the rule of decisions on the merits, in
matters of evidence, or limitations of time occasionally even in criminal
matters. 15 7 If he had not changed his perspective on the subject, Benfield
could have been an instance in which state law would be the rule of
decisions.
Randolph had written an opinion in 1792 that stated both that the United
States had not, by constitution or municipal act, adopted the law of nations
and that nonetheless the law of nations was part of the law of the land. 158
Perhaps Randolph thought that that was the consequence of the Judic:iary
Act. Or perhaps he thought the federal government was completely
possessed of common law authority, both as a source of jurisdiction and as
a means of executing that jurisdiction, although the sources thus far cited do
not quite establish that as his position. Whatever his opinion, however,. the
indictments Randolph and Rawle produced in Benfield were rather mild. 159

153. Ibid. at 1116.
154. William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United
States, 3 vols. (Chicago, 1953) i, 629-30.
155. Report of the Attorney General Read in the House of Representatives Dec. 31, 1790
(1791) 10.
156. Ibid. at 10, 28.
157. Ibid. at 33. William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the American Constitution, !:upra
note 154 at i, 626-30. Goebel's remarks on Randolph seem rather better than
Crosskey's, particularly in reference to the way in which the report was relegated
without action by the Congress. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 541-42.
Congress apparently considered the ambiguity Randolph found a proper and unambig··
uous omission.
158. Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States, 30 vols. (Washington,
1852-1919) i, 27 [hereinafter: Off Opinions A.G.].
159. Whether Randolph or Rawle had the greater responsibility for the indictments is
unclear. There has survived in print a draft indictment written by Randolph with
marginal notations apparently by Hamilton. 11 F. Cas. 1115-16n. Nevertheless, the
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All twelve counts cited treaties; only six referred to the law of nations; none
were based directly on common law. 160
William Rawle was similarly circumspect. He followed Wilson's general
argument, agreeing that the law of nations was part of the law of the land
and that an individual waging war was in violation of the law of nations and
thus indictable. 161 He once mentioned English 'national common law' . 162
His point then, however, was in regard to the law of nations. He did not
maintain that the federal government had adopted English common law.
Both Randolph and Rawle worked in this case on a relatively restricted
argument, regardless of the powers that they might otherwise have felt
inhered in the federal government.
Du Ponceau, Ingersoll, and Sergeant argued for the defence. 163 They
made two arguments relevant here, preserved only in outline. The first was
that 'the indictment did not include an offence at common law' . 164 Their
concern with the common law probably derived from the shared assumption
that the law of nations was part of the common law. That the law of nations,
not the common law as such, was central, appears from the prosecution's
care to refute a law of nations argument on the right of a freeman to enlist
in a foreign government's military service. 165 Moreover, the defense
certainly argued the law of nations. 166 The second relevant argument made

report makes it seem that Rawle carried the argument: 'Mr. Rawle, district attorney,
with whom was Mr. Randolph, attorney general.' II F. Cas. 1116. Rawle's influence
appeared also in the application of Pennsylvania law. See text at notes 146-60 infra.
The importance of Pennsylvania law might indicate that Rawle had a hand in the
indictments also.
160. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 625. Goebel mentions that the common
law disturbance of the peace of the United States allegation only appeared in the
inclusion of the words 'against the peace and dignity of the United States' and that those
words were treated as mere surplusage. Ibid. The reason for the inclusion of those
words, however, is even less indicative than he thought of an idea of a general federal
common law. See text at notes 172-73 infra.
161.
The law of nations is part of the law of the land. 4 Bl. Comm. 66; [Res publica v.
De Longchamps] 1 Dall. [1 U.S.] 111; C. L. lib. This is an offence against the
laws of nations. It is punishable by indictment on information as such. [Respublica
v. De Longchamps] 1 Dall. [I U.S.] 114, &c.; 3 Burrows, 1480.
11 F. Cas. at 1117.
162. Ibid. ('Nor are these only the speculations of the closet. We see them carried into effect
in England in affirmation of national common Jaw, i.e. the Jaw of nations.')
163. 1bid. at 1119. Du Ponceau decades later made some comments on the case. See text at
note 196 infra.
164. 11 F. Cas. at 1119.
165. Ibid. at 1118.
166. Ibid. at 1119 ('On the question under the laws of nations were cited, 6 Hume, Hist.
Eng. 433; 1 Hutch. Hist. Mass. Bay, 251; 3 Vatt. LawNat. 15; Bynk[ershoek] 22d, c.;
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for Henfield was that since 'there was no statute giving jurisdiction, the
court could take no cognizance of the offence' . 167 That argument should
have, but did not elicit a response referring to the Judiciary Act, § 11.168 The
closest counterpart to this. was the prosecution's careful response to an
alleged lack of precedent. 169 Whatever the detailed arguments for Hen field
were, no one seems to have raised the problem of exercising a constitutionally permissible jurisdiction without statutory definition of the crime.
The prosecution expected to apply Pennsylvania law. The argument in the
case dealt at length with the incorporation of the law of nations into the
common law, so that the case was a case at common law. The reason for
insisting on that nexus between the law of nations and the common law was
to establish the applicable law. The Judiciary Act §34 specified that at lrials
at common law the applicable law was the law of the state, unless federal
law dictated otherwise. 170 By linking the law of nations to the common law,
the prosecutors brought the suit under the Judiciary Act, thus providing a
rule of decision.
Various references indicate that the prosecutors were following Pennsylvania law. At decisive points the prosecution cited Respublica v. De
Longchamps, 171 a Pennsylvania state court case decided in 1784, well
before the Constitution. De Longchamps had assaulted Marbois, the Fn!nch
Consul General, Consul for the state of Pennsylvania, and secretary of the
French Legation 'in violation of the laws of nations, against the peace and
dignity of the United States and of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania' . 172
This state court case, not Randolph's theories, 173 dictated the form of the!
indictment. McKean, C.J., ruled that the law of nations was part of the law
of Pennsylvania and that the law for the case would be derived from
treatises. 174 Moreover, the De Longchamps indictment, regardless of any

Syn. Gal. Rep. 94.') Du Ponceau later (1810), published a translation of
Bynkershoek's Treatise on the Law of War.
167. II F. Cas. at 1119. The other arguments recorded related to the presidential
proclamation of neutrality and to the proper inferences that could be derived from the
construction of treaties, neither of which is relevant to the federal common law of
crimes.
168. See text at notes 39-48 supra.
169. II F. Cas. 1117.
170. Act of September 24, 1789, §34. A federal judge explicitly adopted this constru·~tion
of the provision in 1807, the same year in which Marshall ruled to the contrary .
Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 345.
171. See note 161 supra.
172. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111.
173. See text at notes 155-60 supra.
174. I U.S. at 114 ('It must be determined on the principles of the laws of nations, which
form a part of the municipal law of Pennsylvania'), and 116 ('The first crime in the
indictment is an infraction of the law of nations. This law, in its full extent, is part of
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seeming absurdity, 175 provided the authority for the use in federal court of
state law to punish an offense against the United States. In 1799 Randolph
maintained that he had probably been doing exactly that in Henfield. 176 The
citation of De Longchamps is thus good evidence that the prosecutors
indicted under the law of nations through common law in order to apply
Pennsylvania state law under the Judiciary Act, §34.
A parallel use of Pennsylvania law confirms the legal theory of Henfield' s
indictment. Henfield argued that he was a French citizen; he had made that
claim a month after his incarceration in Philadelphia. 177 The argument was
based on the right to emigrate, a right 'natural to freemen' . 178 The
prosecution did not deny the right, but only sought to show that it did not
apply when the accused had still claimed U.S. citizenship at his arrest. 179 In ·
argument, the defense asserted that: 'The bill of rights declares, emigration
shall not be prohibited. '180 The federal Bill of Rightsl81 says nothing about
emigration. The Pennsylvania Constitution, however, did. The first Consti-

the law of this state, and is to be collected from the practice of different nations, and
the authority of writers.')
175. William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, supra note 154 at i, 63ln.
Crosskey worried that in the case of an offence strictly against the United States there
would be no applicable state law.
176. In 1799 Randolph explained to Madison what, at that distance, he thought he must have
been doing in Henfield.
5. This must have been the idea, if I meant to say that he was triable at common
law in the federal court; that the treaties, by stipulating for peace with the U.S.,
in substance prohibited the citizens of the U. S. from engaging in a war against the
nations with whom the treaties subsisted: that treaties being the supreme law, and
the judicial act having provided that the laws of the States should be the rule of
decision, that they should apply: the laws of Pennsylvania, within whose
boundaries the offence was committed, comprehending the common law, would
aid the treaty, which had specified no penalty for Henfield's crime, by one of its
general principles, namely, that when a statute forbids a thing to be done, without
annexing a penalty, the common law makes it indictable and punishable, as a
misdemeanor. This, I believe, was the doctrine which I urged at the trial.
6. This opinion does not bring up the common law as the law of the U.S . . . .
common law, as the law of the U.S., would create offences.
Moncure Daniel Conway, Omitted Chapters of History Disclosed in the Life and Papers
of Edmund Randolph (New York, 1888) 185.
Crosskey belittled Randolph's recollection and asserted that there was no record of
any such argument at the Henfield trial, without bothering to look into the sources cited
in the case. William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, supra note 154
at i, 630-31.
177. 11 F. Cas. at 1116.
178. Ibid. at 1118.
179. Ibid. at 1116.
180. Ibid. at 1118.
181. U.S. Const. Amend. 1-X.
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tution of Pennsylvania referred to emigration as a 'natural inherent right', 182
perhaps the source of part of the language in the case. 183 The Constitution
of Pennsylvania of 1790, Art. IX, §25, provided 'that emigration from the
State shall not be prohibited' . 184 Although the lawyers disagreed about
applicability, both sides considered the provision binding: Pennsylvania
state law applied in this prosecution for a strictly federal offense.
Justice Wilson would favor such arguments. He had assisted the Pennsylvania attorney general in De Longchamps. 185 He thus knew that Pennsylvania had accepted the law of nations into its state law. Moreover, as a
Pennsylvanian himself and the chief architect of the 1790 Pennsylvania
constitution, he would be amenable to applying Pennsylvania law . 186 The
citation of the leading Pennsylvania case, the acceptance of Pennsylvania
constitutional provisions as binding, and the familiarity of Justice W:ilson
with Pennsylvania law make it clear that the court was applying the law of
Pennsylvania as the rule of decision.
The Judiciary Act §34 dictated that result. 187 Although Marshall in dicta
later indicated a preference to apply §34 only to civil cases, 188 his reading

182. William Swindler, Sources and Documents, supra note 94 at viii, 279.
183. See text at note 178 supra.
184. William Swinder, Sources and Documents, supra note 94 at viii, 293. The use of the
words 'law of the land' is less significant. The phrase was derived from Magna Carta.
Magna Carta (1215), ch. 39 (to become ch. 29 in later revisions); Bernard Schwartz,
The Bill of Rights, supra note 91 at i, 12. That provision was the distant antecedent of
the fifth amendment provision against the taking of 'life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law'. U.S. Const. Amend. V. The U.S. Constitution, of course, does
not use the words 'law of the land'. But the corresponding provision in the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 did. Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1790, Art. IX,
§9, William Swinder, Sources and Documents, supra note 94 at 292. It is thus
conceivable that the 'law of the land' language in Henfield likewise demonstrates use
of Pennsylvania law, although the words were common enough in legal parlan·~e to
have been drawn from many other sources.
185. De Longchamps, I U.S. (I Dall.) Ill at 113.
186. Dictionary of American Biography, II vols. (New York, 1936) x, 329.
187. 'Sec. 34. And be it further enacted, That the laws of the several states, except where
the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the coUJts of
the United States in cases where they apply. 'Act of Sept. 24, 1789, I Stars. at 92.
Reference to state criminal law would not be unheard of, since the federal courts i·n the
District of Columbia applied the criminal law of the states of Maryland and Virginia.
albeit in an unusual jurisdiction. United States v. Heinegan, 26 F. Cas. 253 (C.C.D.C.
I802)(No. 15,340). United States v. Winslow, 28 F. Cas. 737 (C.C.D.C. 1812)(No.
16,741). United States v. Gassaway, 25 F. Cas. 1263 (C.C.D.C. 1844)(No. 15,190).
188. After quoting the Judiciary Act, §34, Marshall went on to describe its effect:
It might certainly be well doubted whether this section, (if it should be constru•!d
to extend to all the proceedings in a case where a reference can be made to the state
laws for a rule of decision at the trial) can comprehend a case where, at the trial
in chief, no such reference can be made. Now in criminal cases the laws of the
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is unwarranted. Both Randolph 189 and Du Ponceau 19o came to the opposite
conclusion. Moreover, §33 and §35 191 relate to criminal matters, so that
context would not restrict §34 to civil matters. 192 Nothing in the wording of
§34 would indicate that it did not apply to criminal matters. Other
constitutional considerations make such an application of §34 to criminal
matters necessary . 193 The rules of decision section of the Judiciary Act
properly applied both to civil and criminal cases at common law, as was
done in Henfield.
United States constitute the sole rule of decision; and no man can be condemned
or prosecuted in the federal courts on a state law. The laws of the several states
therefore cannot be regarded as rules of decision in trials for offences against the
United States. It would seem to me too that the technical term, 'trials at common
law', used in the section, is not correctly applicable to prosecutions for crimes. I
have always conceived them to be, in this section, applied to civil suits, as
contradistinguished from those which come before the court sitting as a court of
equity or admiralty.
David Robertson, ed., Reports of the Trials of Colonel Aaron Burr In the Circuit
Court of the United States, 2 vols., (New York, 1807) ii, 482. Marshall's tentative
opinion is not indicative of practice. In 1800, a federal court looked into Pennsylvania
law as to summoning congressmen as witnesses in a libel trial. Justice Peters asserted
personal knowledge of the Pennsylvania practice, but Justice Chase preferred to follow
an independent course. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 626 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800)(No.
14,861). In the same year, counsel for the accused expressly cited §34 as authority for
using the English practice of jury authority in criminal authority, since Virginia law had
adopted English common law; Justice Chase rejected the implications of the argument.
United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800)(No. 14,709). In United
States v. Moore, the court inquired into Pennsylvania practice in regard to compulsory
process for witnesses prior to an indictment, but found that there had been no
adjudications on the normal practice. 26 F. Cas. 1208 (C.C.D. Pa. 180l)(No. 15,805).
The prosecution in United States v. Smith asserted that state law governed practices
relating to tendering expenses with service of a subpoena. 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.
N.Y. 1806)(No. 16,342). As late as 1818 counsel alleged in United States v. Hare that
state law, because of §34, applied to the problems of mail robbers who merely stood
mute and refused to plead. The court ruled that if the laws of the United States were
insufficient, Maryland law sufficed as the rule of decision. 26 F. Cas. 149, 150-157
(C.C.D. Md. 1818)(No. 15,304). Bridwell and Whitten cited Marshall's determination
here as an early decision, and then went on to show how any inclusion of criminal suits
at common law for §34 was clearly mistaken. Randall Bridwell and Ralph U. Whitten,
The Constitution and the Common Law, supra note 12 at 36-37. Johnson dismissed the
relevance of §34 to criminal law by reference to Marshall's opinion and Commonwealth
v. Schaffer. George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Hist. S.C., supra note 12 at
634-35. Schaffer was a case in the mayor's court of Philadelphia in which the argument
concerning §34 was made but was then rejected by the court. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) xxvi,
xxviii, xxxi, Appendix.
189. See note 176 supra.
190. Peter S. Du Ponceau, A Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of the Courts of the
United States (Philadelphia, 1824) 36-37.
191. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, I Stats. 92-93.
192. PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 37-38.
193. See text at notes 216-43 infra.
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~istor:;

Review

Peter Du Ponceau made thm: argument in a treatise in 1824, 194 but not in
regard to Benfield. He explained the difference between the common law as
a source of jurisdiction and the common law as a means of exercising a
jurisdiction granted by Constitution or statute. 19 5 Du Ponceau treated
Benfield only in a note. 196 He objected to Wilson's emphasis on the
common law, since the offense was against the law of nations, which stood
on an independent basis. 197 Du Ponceau did not integrate Benfield into his
analysis. On the basis of the clause 'where they apply' in the Judiciary Act,
§34, he maintained that offenses solely against the United States had no
appropriate state law. 198 Henfield was such a case, so §34 did not apply. He
did not consider the way in which cases like De Longchamps made state law
applicable to federal offenses. Du Ponceau, in all this, professed to have
come to a new understanding of the law only recently. 199 He displayed no
realization that the emphasis on the common law allowed application of tht!
rules of decision clause and no recollection that they had used Pennsylvania
law. Developments in the succeeding years explain his feeling of novelty. 200
Wilson in Benfield applied Pennsylvania law according to the Judiciary
Act, §34. Pennsylvania had applicable law from the time prior to the
Constitution when the states justifiably prosecuted crimes against the
confederacy. He demonstrated no belief in a general federal common law of
crime or in a federal government of inherent authority rather than one of
delegated powers. Since state law was available as the rule of decision,
Congress only had to grant the jurisdiction and did not have to define the:
crimes or the penalties. 201 The controversy occasioned by Benfield had
much more to do with popular feelings in favor of republican France than
194. Ibid. For other early treatises that cover the cases, see Thomas Serjeant, Constitu ..
tiona! Law. Being a View of the Practice and Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United
States and of Constitutional Points Decided (Philadelphia, 1830) 272-74, and William
Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America, (New York, 2nd
ed., 1970) 258-73.
195. PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at xiii, xxviii, 17-20. The argument
was not novel. Justice Washington seems to have been employing the same distinction
in United States v. McGill, quoted supra note 62.
196. PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 3-4.
197. Ibid.
198. Ibid. at 41-42. See text at note 175 supra.
199.
I did not, any more than others, escape the general contagion. It was not until after
repeated discussions of these questions in the law academy, that I began to
perceive that the words 'common law jurisdiction', had no definite meaning, and
was led to enter into this investigation of the subject.
PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 6n.
200. See text at notes 253-67 infra.
201.
I shall endeavor to prove to you, that it is not true as a general principle, that the
judiciary whether in criminal or civil cases, have not jurisdiction of the commc•n
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with the legal analysis. 202 Although the jury acquitted Henfield, Wilson,
like Jay, .had performed his duty. Henfield, like Jay's 1790 charge, is
irrelevant to the existence of a federal common law of crime.203

C. The Views of Iredell and Paterson
The views of Justices Iredell and Paterson around the time of Henfield
confirm that the decision does not approve the notion of a federal common
law of crimes. Stewart Jay has recently isolated James Iredell as a prominent
exception to what he sees as Justice Jay's advocacy of federal common law
authority, but an exception that fell by the wayside. 204 Iredell did initially read
the Article I §8, cl. 1 definitional power as necessarily exercised in advance
of court action. 205 Iredell re-evaluated his stand in 1794, in his charges to the
grand juries of North and South Carolina. 206 This re-evaluation was hardly
the affirmation, as Stewart Jay assumes, of a federal common law of crime.
Iredell's views in 1794 mirror the views expressed in H enfield that the
common law being applied was state, not federal common law.
law, or cannot take cognisance of common law offences; that, on the contrary,
whenever jurisdiction is completely vested in them from either of the sources
above mentioned, they have cognisance of the law, whatever it may be, that is
necessary to give effect to that jurisdiction, and they are not in all cases to wait
until Congress have legislated upon the subject.
Peter S. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 32.
Bridwell and Whitten discard the distinction between 'jurisdiction of' and 'jurisdiction from' the common law. They note that Story approved of the former, but not the
latter. They also note, however, that the distinction is useless.
[f]or the fundamental objection to the exercise of such power is the same in both
cases. The objection is that criminal law results peculiarly from an exercise of the
sovereign lawmaking authority, which in our system was originally confided to the
legislative branch of government.
Randall Bridwell and Ralph Whitten, The Constitution and the Common Law, supra
note 12 at 46. Story, of course, was familiar with that conception of criminal law, so
their casual rejection of the distinction and of Story's authority can be easily questioned.
They note that common law in civil matters derives from community behavior, a factor
that makes it distinctly different from criminal law. Ibid. But the law of nations derives,
in eighteenth century literature, from the community behavior of nations.
202. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 53-56.
203. See text at notes 128-30 supra.
204. Stewart Jay, 'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12 at 1040.
205. Ibid. Stewart Jay cites Iredell's South Carolina charge of 12 May 1794. Stewart Jay,
'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12 at 1041. He does not mention the
North Carolina charge of 2 June 1794, which seems to coincide closely with the South
Carolina charge of the previous month.
206. James Iredell, 'Charge delivered to the grand jury for the District of North Carolina in
the Circuit court of the United States, June 2, 1794', in Joseph H. Smith, Cases and
Materials, supra note 108, 524-26.
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Iredell's North Carolina charge was a minor treatise.2°7 The first section
treats English law; it begins by mentioning English common law and ends
with a comment on an act of Parliament. Iredell in this section established
first that English common law recognized the principles of the law of
nations. Then he noted that no nation ought to legislate contrary to those
principles, but that such legislation, if passed, would be binding. Finally, he
argued that common law recognition of the law of nations entailed
enforcement of law of nations' prohibitions on a country's own citizens. An
individual's contravention of a law of nations obligation would constitute 'a
contempt of his duty to the community'; 208 the courts could proceed against
him under that theory. The first section concerned only English common
law, although the hearers would have inferred from the mere mentions of
'the common law' an application to the United States.
The second section applied English principles to the North Amelican
context. English common law had applied in colonial North Carolina. The
only exceptions were provided by special colonial circumstances or statute.
The principles of the law of nations fell under neither exception. Thus, at the
time of the Revolution, the law of nations portion of the English common
law was accepted in North Carolina: 'this part of the common law subsisted
in full force in this State previous to the Revolution' .209 The application he
was making was not to the United States government, but to the state
government of North Carolina.
The third section dealt with the consequences of the Revolution.
Principles of the common law in force in the colonies were abolished only
when 'absolutely inconsistent' 210 with the change in situation or when
altered by the people or the legislature. Iredell denied that such changes
relating to the law of nations had been made. The English common law
recognition of the law of nations, by its application in the colony, now
applied within the state of North Carolina. Whereas Herifield had built on a
specific case, Iredell replicated the H enfield result on the basis of the general
structure of state common law.
The fourth section of Iredell's charge considered possible modifications
of state law by the Articles of Confederation or the Constitution. Under the
Articles of Confederation state law was not altered, because any law of
nations prosecution would take place in a 'competent State court, acting
under the laws of the State and the control of their public duty' .211 Nor did
the Constitution alter state law. The Constitution only allowed Congress two
relevant powers: the power to establish federal courts for such cases and the
power to make any alterations necessary in the law. Iredell then cited the

207. James Iredell, 'Charge', supra note 206.
208. Ibid. at 525.
209. Ibid.
210. Ibid.
211. Ibid. at 526.
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rules of decision section of the Judiciary Act to show that Congress had
considered the relevant state law in force. 212 The congressional act for
punishing offenses against the United States only modified that law; where
United States law was silent, state common law applied.
Iredell's jurisprudence does not sustain any argument for a federal
common law of crime. He believed that the federal courts could prosecute
nonstatutory crimes. But just as nonstatutory prosecutions are not all
similar, resorts to 'common law' are not all the same. Federal jurisdiction
derived both from the Constitution and from the Judiciary Act. The law that
would apply in such cases, as mandated by federal statute, was not federal
law, but state common law.
Stewart Jay has located an opinion by Justice Paterson which, contrary to
Jay's interpretation, is best viewed in the same way as Iredell's charge.2 13
Paterson stated that a violator, in Henfield's situation, could be prosecuted.
He explicitly drew the law of nations then into the common law. 'This is an
offence. -How? By the law of nations, or, in other words, by the common
law, which comprehends the law of nations. ' 214 He did not expound on
whose common law, but the association, made both by Iredell and in
Henfield, was undoubtedly made to establish state common law as the rule
of decision. More interestingly for the contrast with post-Wiscart cases, is
Paterson's specification that such a case arose 'under the constitution, as
distinct from an offence arising under the law of the United States' .215 The
case arose under the Constitution because of the grant of admiralty
jurisdiction in Article III and the congressional power to define offenses in
Article I §8, cl. 10, with jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act.
In 1794 Jay, Wilson, Iredell, and Paterson can, therefore, be identified as
supporting limited constitutional jurisdiction over nonstatutory offenses.
The sources for that jurisdiction were simply irrelevant to seditious libel
prosecutions. The common law that they applied was not federal, but state
common law. The way in which they handled the law of nations but did not
extend their jurisdiction to seditious libel and other merely common law
crimes accorded both with the Constitution and the debates and statutes of
the First Congress. In 1794 the Supreme Court had no doubt that the federal
government was different from state governments and that the demands of
federalism, as dictated by statute, mandated reliance on state law.

D. United States v. Ravara
Joseph Ravara was a Genoese consul prosecuted in 1793-94 for sending
threatening letters to extort money from Mr. Hammond, the British
212. Ibid.
213. Stewart Jay, 'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12 at 1052, n. 243.
214. Ibid.
215. Ibid. See text at notes 282-330 infra.
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Minister. 216 His defense argued that the allegation did not constitute a
statutory or common law crime, that the law of nations required immunity
for consuls, and that the evidence was too circumstantiaJ.2 17 Ravara was
convicted without reference to statutory authority.21s Since the case did not
rest on the law of nations, it presents a different issue in the history of the
supposed federal common law of crimes.
Rawle's argument was convincing, although only briefly reported.
Ravara claimed the status of a public minister, although he was only a
consul. Defense cited only Vattel for the protection due a consul. 219 Ra.wle
denied that consular status implied immunity. His denial can be explained
by three arguments. Article III specifies federal jurisdiction over cettain
persons, including 'Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls·· .220
That wording implies that consuls are not public ministers. The Judiciary
Act § 13 makes the same distinction: 'jurisdiction of suits brought by
ambassadors or other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul
shall be a party' .221 Similarly, the treaties in force at the time of Ravara did
not give consuls immunity.22 2 Finally, only Vattel considered consuls public
ministers; other writers excluded consuls from immunity. 223 Even Vattel
thought protection only proper, not required. 224 Ravara had no convincing
claim to immunity.
A different defense was the alleged lack of a statutory or common law
basis for the suit. Julius Goebel dismissed the defense's argument about the

216. United States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 713 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793)(No. 16,122). Leonard
Levy barely mentions Ravara. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note
12 at 276.
217. United States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 714 (C.C.D. Pa. 1794)(No. 16,122a). The issue
in this preliminary stage had to do with whether the original jurisdiction over consuls
(U.S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. I) intended an exclusive jurisdiction, such that the grant
of 'exclusive' jurisdiction to the circuit courts (Judiciary Act, § 11) was void. Although
the argument properly failed there, the issue as to whether statute could narrow federal
court jurisdiction came to be vital. See text at notes 255-61 infra.
218. Ibid. at 715.
219. Ibid.
220. U.S. Const. Art. lll, §2, cl. I.
221. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stats. 80-81. Prior to the trial of Ravara and in an unrelated
case, William Bradford, Attorney General, gave his opinion based on the constitutional
language and on the Judiciary Act that a consul is not a public minister and not entitled
to the immunity due public ministers. Off. Opinions of the A. G., supra note 158 at i,
42. The worries here about the place of trial conflicting with original criminal
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is obviated by the decision in Ravara. See note 217
supra.
222. Commonwealth v. Kosloff, 5 Serg. & Rawle 544, 545-46 (Pennsylvania, 1819).
Tilghman, C.J. here analyzed Ravara.
223. Ibid. at 545.
224. Ibid.; Vattel, Law of Nations, supra note 126 at 147-49 (Bk. 2, ch. 2, §34).
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lack of a statutory basis as nonsense, 225 because section 28 of the Act for the
Punishment of certain Crimes declared the punishment for offering personal
violence to a public minister. 226 Nevertheless, Rawle insisted that 'the
offense was indictable at common law' .227 The indictment could have had a
statutory basis, even though the prosecution preferred to use the common
law.
Ignoring the statute, the court relied on the common law. The defense had
denied a common law foundation, citing Blackstone228 to the effect that a
bare menace of bodily hurt without any consequent inconvenience, such as
damage to one's business affairs, was no injury public or private.zzg English
common law, however, was not necessarily the law of Pennsylvania. And
Justices Jay and Peters were concerned with Pennsylvania law. Respublica
v. Teischer23° and Respublica v. Sweers,m both cited by Rawle,232 showed
sufficiently that Ravara was indictable under Pennsylvania law. Du Ponceau
maintained later that Ravara had been tried under Pennsylvania common
law. 23 3 Moreover, since Ravara's intended victim was a public minister,
even though Ravara himself was not, the protection given the minister was
necessarily rigorous. Rawle could have cited Vattel, IV.8l-82, had the
225.
United States v. Ravara is badly reported. The defense is represented to have taken
the ground that the acts charged were not crimes by the common law or by any
positive law of the United States. This was, of course, nonsense because by
Section 27 of the Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes, offering personal
violence to a public minister was made punishable. It was also argued by defense
that a criminal proceeding ought not to be sustained against an individual of
defendant's official character.
Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 627. The citation to Section 27 should
be Section 28.
226. Act of April 30, 1790, I Stats. 112, 118.
227. See text at notes 220-24 supra.
228. William Blackstone, Commentaries, supra note 83 at iii, 120.
229. Ravara, II F. Cas. at 714.
230. I U.S. (I Dall.) 335 (Pennsylvania, 1788). McKean, C.J., set down the general
principle for indictments in Pennsylvania as not founded on precedent.
It is true, that on the examination of the cases we have not found the line accurately
drawn but, it seems to be agreed, that whatever amounts to a public wrong may be
made the subject of an indictment. The poisoning of chickens; cheating with false
dice; fraudulently tearing a promissory note, and many other offenses of a similar
description, have heretofore been indicted in Pennsylvania.

Ibid. at 338.
231. I U.S. (I Dall.) 41 (Pennsylvania, 1779).
232. Ravara, II F. Cas. at 715.
233. PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 35-36. Justice Washington felt
that a violation of the Act of April 30, 1790, §28 produced 'an offence at common law'.
United States v. Liddle, 26 F. Cas. 936, 938 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808)(No. 15,598).
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support of the law of nations been necessary. 234 And the law of nations was
part of the law of Pennsylvania.235
A circular instruction issued by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to
district attorneys, including the District Attorney of Pennsylvania, is
conclusive on the relevance of Pennsylvania law. The letter responded to
French complaints about the treatment of their consuls. Jefferson asked that
those consuls be notified that, as Goebel paraphrases the letter, 'the federal
government would put into effect all the means of protection which the :;tate
laws provided' .236 The easiest reading of such language is that the federal
courts would apply state law to render justice to those classes of persons,
including consuls, over whom the federal courts had jurisdiction.
Ravara was thus not a prosecution under federal common law. The
federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over all cases concerning consuls.237 The Judiciary Act gave the circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction 'Nith
the Supreme Court over consuls. 238 Pennsylvania common law then dictated
that Ravara could be indicted in state court. The deduction from these
propositions was that the case take place in federal court, but under ~•tate
law. Ravara was not a sinister precursor of seditious libel prosecutions. Tht:
case caused no uproar,2 39 but likewise violated no constitutional principle.
Article III personal jurisdictions240 do not carry with them plenary
congressional legislative authority, only federal court jurisdiction over tht:
designated persons. Consuls were not public ministers and were subject to
the law of the country of residence. Nevertheless, since federal courts were
to have sole jurisdiction over consuls, 241 violations of state health, safety,,
and morals regulations, normally tried as misdemeanors, had to be tried in
federal courts. These matters were violations of state substantive law, over
which Congress had no direct authority. 242 The federal courts had an

234. Vattel, Law of Nations, supra note 126 at 464-66 (Bk. IV, ch.7, §§81-82).
235. See text at note 174 supra.
236. Julius Goebel,Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 629 (citing Charles Jenkins, <!d.,)
Jefferson's Germantown Letters (Philadelphia, 1906) 126.
237. U.S. Const. Art. III, §2, cl. I. For the proposition that the word 'suit' in the Judiciary
Act can refer to both criminal and civil actions, see U.S. v. Mann, 26 F. Cas. ll53
(C.C.D. N.H. 1812)(No. 15,718).
238. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, §II, I Stats. at 78-79.
239. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 56-58.
240. U.S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. I ('The judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls').
241. U.S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. I; Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§9, II, I Stats. 76-79.
242. The federal government has such authority only in the seat of government and in those
areas purchased by the federal government with the consent of the state legislature.
U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 17.
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exclusive jurisdiction but could not apply federal substantive law. State law
was the appropriate rule of decision.243

E. U.S. v. Greenleaf
In 1795 and soon after the conviction of Ravara, the government initiated
prosecution against Greenleaf, editor of the New-York Journal, for libel of
Hammond, the same British Minister that Ravara had threatened. 244 As with
the previous cases, U.S. v. Greenleaf does not indicate the existence of a
federal common law of crime.
In September 1794 Hammond had complained to the United States
Secretary of State about a defamatory article by Greenleaf in the New York
Journal. The U.S. Attorney General thought it prima facie libellous and
observed, in accord with but not citing Vattel, 245 that the law of nations
required that public ministers be preserved 'not only from violence but also
from insult' .246 Goebel thought the jurisdiction might be established by
Article III, Section 2, 247 but that no attention was paid to the problem of
common law criminal matters when the Secretary of State forwarded the
case along for prosecution to the U.S. attorney in New York directing him
'to proceed upon it as the law directs' .248
Federal court utilization of state law will satisfy Goebel's worries about
common law crimes. First amendment249 concerns would not arise for
precisely that reason. The first amendment in terms forbids Congress from
making laws abridging the freedom of the press. Without the assistance of
the fourteenth amendment, 250 the first amendment did not prevent the
federal courts from applying state law restricting the press in those
jurisdictions granted by the Constitution which nevertheless lie outside
congressional legislative authority: cases under diversity jurisdiction and

243. Peter S. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 34. See also the criticism of
Justice Chase for refusing (to use Virginia Jaw in United States v. Callendar). Julius
Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 651.
244. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 629. Neither Levy nor Jay analyzes
Greenleaf. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 276; Stewart
Jay 'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12.
245. Vattel, Law of Nations, supra note 126 at 464-65 (Bk. IV, ch.7, §§81-82).
246. Off. Opinions A. G. supra note 158 at i, 52-53. Goebel's quotation of the opinion is
erroneous, but not in a way to affect his analysis. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra
note 20 at 629.
247. U.S. Const. Art. Ill, §2, cl. I.
248. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 629.
249. U.S. Const. Amend. I.
250. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. Sec Robert C. Palmer, 'The Parameters of Constitutional
Reconstruction', supra note 15 at 739.
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positive regulations of consuls not related to foreign affairs.25I The case is
also completely appropriate and justifiable under the Constitution, the
Judiciary Act § 11 and §34, and under the circular instruction in 1793 from
the Secretary of State. 252 Prior to Wiscart, then, the federal judiciary had
shown no belief in a federal common law of crime.

IV. Wiscart v. Dauchy
Wiscart v. Dauchy, 253 decided in 1796, produced a substantial change in
prosecutions of crimes and offenses against the United States. Wis.cart
involved not a crime or offense, but rather the extent to which the
Constitution could be self-executing. Prior to Wiscart in the law of nations
cases, Article III, §2's vesting of admiralty cases (followed by the Judiciary
Act) reinforced by Article III, §2's vesting of jurisdiction over cases arising
under the Constitution and Article I, §8, cl. lO's mention of the law of
nations, provided a firm basis for prosecution. That conceptualization
produced an acceptable result if state law was the rule of decision. After
Wiscart prosecutors and justices based prosecutions on cases arising under
the laws (not the Constitution) of the United States, but in a much mow
tenuous way. The change involved in arguing from laws instead of from the
Constitution was substantial. The cases following Wiscart are problematic;
the cases before Wiscart are not.
Wiscart v. Dauchy arose on the equity side of the circuit court in the
Virginia district. Wiscart had fraudulently attempted to prevent a recovery
of the amount of a prior decree by conveying away all his real and personal
property. The circuit court found the conveyances fraudulent and awarded
enforcement of the prior judgment for the defrauded party. Wiscart then
obtained a writ of error to the Supreme Court. The issue was whether th~:
determination of fact by the circuit court was binding. The Supreme Court
held that it was binding.254
The decision turned on the difference between an appeal and a writ of
error. The decision construed the constitutional provision: 'In all other Cases
before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make. ' 255 That language could have mandated and by itself
conveyed to the court a proper appellate procedure to permit the Supreme
251. PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 33-35.
252. See text at note 236 supra.
253. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796). The case normally cited for the necessity of statut,~s to
exercise jurisdiction is Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8. Turner is
a better citation for the proposition, even though the doctrine began with the judicial
understanding of Wiscart.
254. Ibid.
255. U.S. Const. Art. III §2, cl. 2.
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Court here to have reviewed both factual and legal determinations of the
circuit court. The Judiciary Act, however, had specified that on final
judgments in civil suits and cases in equity a writ of error would lie. 256 A
writ of error was different from an appeal: in error only the law could be
reviewed. 257
Even though Wiscart was an equity case, the court wished to establish a
general principle about the appellate jurisdiction. 258 The issue was whether
the Judiciary Act had altered, or could alter, appellate procedure to the
Supreme Court. Justice Wilson distinguished admiralty and maritime suits
from suits in equity for the purposes of review. He argued that the Judiciary
Act §22 used 'civil' in opposition to maritime and admiralty instead of in
opposition to criminal. Thus error would lie for review in the Supreme Court
in equity: for civil (that is, not maritime or admiralty) suits. The Judiciary
Act thus did not provide for appellate jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime
suits. Admiralty appellate procedure was set in the Constitution. Since
Congress had not provided exceptions or regulations, the appeal process
normal in maritime and admiralty law remained untouched. 25 9 Wilson
argued that the constitutional provision would even have controlled an
express congressional limitation of the appellate structure. 260 Apparently, he
considered that Congress could except certain classes of cases from review;
but if review was desirable, it had to be properly appellate. Wilson
considered that portion of Article III self-executing. 261

256. Act of September 24, 1789, §22, I Stats. 73 at 84-85.
257. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 327.
258. Idid. at 324:
If causes of equity or admiralty jurisdiction are removed hither, accompanied with
a statement of facts, but without the evidence, it is well; and the statement is
conclusive as to all the facts, which it contains. This is unanimously the opinion
of the court.
If such causes are removed with a statement of the facts, and also with the
evidence;-still the statement is conclusive, as to all the facts contained in it. This
is the opinion of the court; but not unanimously.

259. Ibid. at 324-27.
260. 'Even, indeed, if a positive restriction existed by law, it would, in my judgment, be
superseded by the superior authority of the constitutional provision.' Ibid. at 325.
261. Self-executing is, of course, different from controlling. Self-executing means that a
provision takes effect without statutory authorization; controlling means that a
provision takes effect despite a statutory mandate to the contrary. The belief that there
was self-executing jurisdiction or procedure has some support. Elbridge Gerry in the
First Congress expounded on federal court jurisdiction.
We are to administer this Constitution, and therefore we are bound to establish
these courts, let what will be the consequence. Gentlemen say they are willing to
establish Courts of Admiralty; but what is to become of the other cases to which
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The rest of the justices, except perhaps Paterson, 262 disagreed. They
thought that the pertinent section of the Judiciary Act used 'civil actions' as
opposed to criminal actions, so that admiralty and maritime cases of a dvil
nature would receive review only by writ of error and not by full appeal.2 63
Ellsworth read the provision not as a specification of a procedure but as a
directive that appellate jurisdiction could only be exercised 'conformably to
such regulations as are made by the Congress'. As long as Congress
specified some procedure, the courts were bound to follow it only. 264
the Continental jurisdiction is extended by the Constitution? When we have
established the courts as they propose, have fixed the salaries, and the Supreme
Executive has appointed the Judges, they will be independent, and no power can
remove them; they will be beyond the reach of the Executive or Legislative pow.~rs
of this Government; they will be unassailable by the State legislatures; nothing <:an
affect them but the united voice of America, and that only by a change of
Government. They will, in this elevated and independent situation, attend to their
duty-their honor and every sacred tie oblige them. Will they not attend to the
Constitution as well as your laws? The Constitution will undoubtedly be their first
rule; and so far as your laws conform to that, they will attend to them, but no
further. Would they then be confined by your laws within a less jurisdiction than
they were authorized to take by the Constitution? You must admit them to be
inferior courts; and the Constitution positively says, that the Judicial powers of the
United States shall be so vested. They would then inquire what were the judic:ial
powers of the Union, and undertake the exercise thereof, notwithstanding ~my
Legislative declaration to the contrary; consequently their. system would bt a
nullity, at least, which attempted to restrict the jurisdiction of the inferior comts.
I Annals 829.
One line of constitutional argument could dictate mandatory judicial review of any
statute that allocated federal court jurisdiction as a whole at less than that mandat,!d by
the Constitution, such that the court itself would allocate the jurisdictions subject to
such subsequent regulations and exceptions of appellate jurisdictions as Congress would
make.
262. Paterson later indicated that he had concurred at least in part with Ellsworth. Jennings
v. The Brig, Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336, 337; Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C.,
supra note 20 at 700n. See also text supra 280. Paterson was, at least later, unwilling
to abide by a completely common law criminal prosecution, while at the same time
agreeing to an inherent authority by the principles of the common law to punish
contempts. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1224. Paterson's exception for
contempts, however, was followed by Justice Johnson in United States v. Hudson and
Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34. The assumption that the federal courts fall heir
to the full power to hold common law contempt proceedings is unquestioned. It might
well be that the contempt powers of a court in a government of delegated powers ought
to be viewed restri.ctively.
263. Wiscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 327-28.
264.

It is observed, that a writ of error is a process more limited in its effects than an
appeal; but, whatever may be the operation, if an appellate jurisdiction can only be
exercised by this court conformably to such regulations as are made by the
Congress, and if Congress has prescribed a writ of error, and no other mode, by
which it can be exercised, still, I say, we are bound to pursue that mode, andean
neither make, nor adopt another. The law may, indeed, be improper and
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The impact of Wiscart need not have been great. Wilson considered the
Constitution self-executing and superior to congressional stipulations.
Ellsworth was somewhat more deferential to Congress. But the disagreement focused on different readings of the Constitution. The pertinent clause
was not obviously self-executing: it expressly posited congressional action.265 The court could easily have maintained, contrary to Wilson, that in
matters touching this portion of the Constitution, it needed a statute before
acting, without formulating a general principle that constitutional provisions
concerning jurisdiction are not self-executing. In fact, no such principle is
enunciated in Wiscart nor would such a general principle be appropriate. 266
The Bill of Rights, various other amendments, constitutional restrictions on
the states, and much of the rest of the Constitution have always been
considered self-executing. The amendment procedure required no statute,
nor was any statute necessary to enforce age requirements for congressional
or executive office-holders. Public perception of a case, however, is often
much more important than the actual holding. 267 And in this situation the
public perception of a general principle was closely related to the holding.
The argument here concerned admiralty jurisdiction and had considered
self-executing provisions in relation to admiralty. Admiralty jurisdiction,
however, had been the route by which the lower federal courts had
constitutional, as distinct from statutory, authority over the law of nations.
Wiscart could easily be made to apply to the law of nations cases.

inconvenient; but it is of more importance, for a judicial determination, to
ascertain what the law is, than to speculate upon what it ought to be.
Ibid. at 328.
265. Ibid.
266. The question put by Ellsworth was whether an exception or regulation by Congress
could swallow the rule in the Constitution; the various possibilities of language demand
careful reading.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those
in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. Const. Art. III, §2, cl. 2.
Federal jurisdiction is usually considered a reserve that Congress can choose to
implement if it wants, that is, that the Constitution specifies the limit of judicial power
but not the necessary extent. Elbridge Gerry saw the separation of powers problem here.
See note 262 supra. And congressional discretion to limit the jurisdiction of the federal
courts (a question distinct from distribution of the jurisdiction among different federal
courts and regulation of procedures) makes the courts dependent on Congress. No
intrinsic reason would demand that the courts not consider the constitutional specification of jurisdiction binding law and an inviolable grant. U.S. Const. Art. VI, §2.
267. See Robert C. Palmer, 'Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction', supra note 15.
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V. Federal Practice After Wiscart

A. Cases Arising Under Laws
Early in 1797 the jurisdiction of the federal courts over law of nations
offenses remained intact. William Jones, a Spanish citizen and inhabitant of
the United States, together with several American citizens, had entered
Florida to recapture his slaves. Upon the complaint of the minister of Spain,
Charles Lee, as the Attorney General, gave his opinion about the legality of
a prosecution. 268 He noted that Congress had been given the power to
legislate on the matter of violations of territorial rights, because wch
violations fell under the law of nations. Congress, however, had not yet
passed such an act. Therefore, he thought, the United States could prosecute
Jones in federal court at common law and inflict a fine and imprisonment for
the misdemeanor, presumably under state law. 269 Writing from Philadel-·
phia, he noted that the law of nations had been made a part of the law of the
land. 270 Lee had not yet changed his notions about federal jurisdiction over
law of nations offenses against the United States not authorized by statute.
Within a year after Wiscart, however, attitudes changed. William
Cobbett, the editor of Porcupine's Gazette, printed several letters libelling
the minister plenipotentiary of Spain. Charles Lee, the Attorney General,
again rendered his opinion on the law. 271 Although Lee was a Virginian, he
knew Pennsylvania law because he had studied in Philadelphia. 272 His
opinion was that Cobbett could be prosecuted in the district court of
Pennsylvania for libel. He then defined freedom of the press, following
Blackstone and citing Lord Mansfield, although noting that until then 'With
respect to national concerns among ourselves, as well as with respect to
268. Off. Opinions A. G., supra note 158 at i, 68.
269. The opinion gives no indication what the rule of decision would be. Determinative of
this question would be the way in which Lee read Henfield. If Lee read the cm:e as
indicating a federal common law, he would probably not envisage application of state
law. That conclusion is possible in early 1797, but not likely.
The constitution gives to Congress, in express words, the power of passing a law
for punishing a violation of territorial rights, it being an offence against the law of
nations, and of a nature very serious in its consequences. That the peace of
mankind may be preserved, it is the interest as well as the duty of every
government to punish with becoming severity all the individuals of the State who
commit this offence. Congress has passed no act yet upon the subject, and Jones
and his associates are only liable to be prosecuted in our courts at common law for
the misdemeanor; and if convicted, to be fined and imprisoned. The common law
has adopted the law of nations in its fullest extent, and made it a part of the law
of the land.
Ibid. at 69.
270. Ibid.
271. I Off. Opinions A. G. supra note 158 at i, 71.
272. Attorneys General of the United States, 1789-1979, (Washington, 1980) 6.
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foreign nations, our presses have been unlimited and unrestrained' .273 He
noted the role of the press in forming public opinion and thought that
ambassadors should be protected from such affronts. The Pennsylvania
version of freedom of the press was at this time completely in accord with
the English version. 274 Thus far Lee's opinion was acceptable, if he was
indeed expounding Pennsylvania law .m
Lee then considered whether the case could be brought directly into the
Supreme Court by virtue of its original jurisdiction.276 He quoted both the
Constitutional provision and the Judiciary Act. The Constitution specified
that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction included all cases affecting
such ministers, 277 whereas the Judiciary Act gave the Supreme Court
exclusive original jurisdiction over such public ministers in cases brought
against them, and original but not exclusive jurisdiction in cases brought by
them.278 The Constitution was thus broader than the statute, since a criminal
libel prosecution of this kind would affect the ambassador (as the person
libelled), but would not involve him as a party. Lee concluded that the
Constitution gave the Supreme Court the 'capacity to hold criminal
jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, which expressions comprehend a libel of an ambassador' but that that capacity had not been utilized. 279
273. I Off Opinions A. G., supra note 158 at i, 72.
274. 'The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of
man; and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty.' Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, Art. IX,
§7, William Swinder, Sources and Documents, supra note 94 at viii, 292.
275. See Francis Wharton, State Trials of the United States (New York, 1849) 322-29 for
state prosecutions of Cobbett.
276. I Off. Opinions A. G., supra note 158 at i, 73.
277. 'The judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls.' U.S. Const. Art. III,§2, cl. I.
278.
The Supreme Court ... shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or
proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers or their domestics, or
domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law
of nations; and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by
ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul, or vice-consul, shall
be a party.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §13, I Stars., at 80-81.
279. I Off. Opinions A. G., supra note 158 at i, 73-74. William Bradford, Attorney General,
in 1794 rendered a superficially similar opinion concerning a riot in front of the house
of a foreign consul. Ibid. at i, 41-43. Bradford handled the difference between
'affecting' and the words of the Judiciary Act as a matter of construction, not as a
matter of narrowing the constitutional mandate. Bradford found the construction of the
Judiciary Act proper because of the further constitutional requirement that crimes be
tried in the state where the crime occurred, an improbability if the Supreme Court were
to have original jurisdiction in such criminal cases. U.S. Const. Art III, §3, cl. 3. A
similar necessity for statutory actions prior to assumption of jurisdiction was evidenced
in congressional argument, but denied by Marshall, in 1800. 10 Annals 614.
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He then referred to Wiscart: 'At the August term, (1796) after mature
consideration, it was determined by four judges of the Supreme Court, that,
with regard to the judicial power of the United States granted by the
constitution, it remains inactive and unexercisable until by law it is drawn
into action'. 280
Lee's summary of Wiscart was overly broad. The Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction could be read to require congressional regulations, but
its original jurisdiction is unambiguous. Moreover, the total jurisdiction of
the federal courts possible by the Constitution, regardless of the distribution,
could legitimately have been considered necessarily mandated. 281 Nonethe··
less, jurisdictional arguments based solely on Constitutional provisions
would now seem suspect: exercise of Article III jurisdiction required some
mediation by statute.

B. The Counterfeiting Cases
In 1797282 and just prior to Lee's opinion, the government prosecuted four
counterfeiting cases that occupy a crucial place in the history of the common
law of crime. The cases came before Ellsworth, C.J., in the circuit court for
the Massachusetts district. Pardon Smith was indicted for counterfeiting
bills of the Bank of the United States. 283 Congress had passed a statute
relating to counterfeiting securities of the Bank of the United States, 284 but
none concerning bills. The case therefore was prosecuted absent a specific

280. I Off. Opinions A. G., supra note !58 at I, 74. Lee's reference to the decision by four
justices confirms that he was referring to Wiscart.
281. See Gerry's comment at note 261 supra. Had Congress followed the option provid·ed in
U.S. Const. Art. II § 2, cl. 2 and allowed the Supreme Court to appoint the justices of
lower federal courts, that requirement of assuming the complete jurisdiction would
seem more compelling.
282. The traditional date for the counterfeiting cases is 1792. United States v. Smith, :~7 F.
Cas. 1147 (C. C. D. Mass. 1792)(No. 16,323). Goebel found the records for the cases,
and the actual date is 1797. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 630n.
283. 27 F. Cas. at 1147.
284. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §14, I Stats. 112, 115. The statute covered the
counterfeiting of 'any certificate, indent, or other public security of the United States'.
The prosecution's assumption was that a bank note was different from a security; a bank
note was certainly different from coin. Had they identified bank notes as securitief., the
appropriate penalty would have been death. Ibid. The decision to differentiate between
the two was thus advantageous to the defendant. For the difference between bank notes
and coin, see U.S. v Bowen, 24 F. Cas. (C.C.D.C. 1817)(No. 14,628). Goebel
recognized the difference between securities and bank notes. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist.
S.C., supra note 20 at 630. Johnson, however, summarized the statute as providing
against counterfeiting 'federal notes and currency', certainly an incorrect rendition.
George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Hist. S.C., supra note 12 at 635.
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statutory delegation of the crime285 and determination of punishment. The
conceptualization of Smith's offense was derived from Wiscart.
U.S. v. Smith was inconsistent with the law of nations cases in that it was
conceived as a case 'arising under ... the Laws of the United States' .286
The Bank of the United States had been established constitutionally by law.
Problems related to the bank only arose because of that legislation, so that
counterfeiting the bank's bills could be considered within the category of
'Cases arising under ... the Laws of the United States' to which the judicial
power of the United States extended. 287 Counterfeiting bills of the Bank of
the United States was accordingly contempt of and a misdemeanor against
the United States. And the Judiciary Act § 11 appropriated the case for the
circuit court. 288
The circuit court applied state law, conformable to the Judiciary Act
§34. 289 The abridged report mentions state law: 'the same offense might be
punished as a common law cheat in the state court' .29o Blackstone's
punishment of a common law cheat was fine, imprisonment, and pillory: 291
Smith was fined and imprisoned. Massachusetts, furthermore, had laws on
the subject. A 1784 statute punished counterfeiting bills of the Massachusetts Bank by seven years hard labor. 292 That statute might not apply,
because it concerned offenses against the Massachusetts Bank; offenses
against the Bank of the United States were not yet possible.293 A Massachusetts statute of 1785, however, prohibited forgery, including forgery of
'any promissory note, . . . warrant, order or request for the payment of
money . . . or any assurance of money or other property whatsoever' .294
The penalties included the pillory, cropping of ears, whipping, imprisoning,

285. The Judiciary Act, § 11 could have served as a general delegation of the crime, although
without any specification as to punishment.
286. U.S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. I. Law of nations cases fall easily under the admiralty
specification of Art. III, §2, cl. 1 or under law of nations clause in Art. I, §8.
Counterfeiting might seem to fall easily under Art. I, §8, cl. 6, but that clause refers
only to counterfeiting securities and coin. Extending that clause to cover bank notes
might not work successfully.
287. U.S. Const. Art. III, §2, cl. I. A similar argument was made in the same year in the
Philadelphia Mayor's Court. Commonwealth v. Schaffer, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at xxix
Appendix.
288. 27 F. Cas. at 1147.
289. See text at notes 187-291 supra.
290. 27 F. Cas. at 1147.
291. William Blackstone, Commentaries, supra note 83 at iv, 158.
292. The First Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 190 (Wilmington, 1981).
293. This situation is different from that in Henfield, in which state precedent was used. In
Henfield, the state had prosecuted for an offense against Pennsylvania and the United
States. In this situation there was no such joint precedent. See text at note 172 supra.
294. The First Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, supra note 292 at 226.
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and fining. 295 This statute could apply to counterfeiting bills of the Bank of
the United States. If the statute was in affirmance of or in modification to the
common law, the wording of the report is explicable. The desire to have it
as a trial at common law derived from the Judiciary Act, which only applied
to trials 'at common law' in federal courts.296
The counterfeiting cases produce two conclusions. The courts were still
using state law as the rule of decision in accord with the Judiciary Act §34.
Wiscart, however, had changed the jurisdictional basis. Law of nations
cases like Henfield had rested in part on Article III admiralty jurisdiction,
and more remotely under the clause 'cases ... arising under this Constitution' .297 Smith was based on the provision concerning 'cases ... arising
under . . . the Laws of the United States'. In the former situation, the
jurisdiction vested because the power was explicitly in the Constitution. In
the latter cases, the link was more tenuous: the court only had jurisdiction
because the offense would not have occurred but for the existence of an
institution constitutionally established by federal law. Although jurisdiction
was attenuated, the court still adhered to state law and had not yet opted for
a federal common law, either as a source of jurisdiction or as a means of
executing a delegated jurisdiction. Wiscart, however, emphasized the
statutory basis of jurisdictions.

C. Worrall
In 1797 Robert Worrall attempted to bribe Tench Coxe, the Commissioner of the Revenue of the United States, to obtain a contract to build the
Cape Hatteras light house. Coxe arranged for Worrall to be apprehended,
whereupon Worrall was indicted, tried and convicted.29s Dallas, for the
defense, moved in arrest of judgment that the federal court did not have
jurisdiction. 299 The argument in Worrall mirrored that in Smith; the
conjunction of the Smith argument and the Wiscart doctrine produced a
federal common law of crime.
Dallas argued against the circuit court's jurisdiction on the basis o:f the
tenth amendment, 300 but distinguished previous cases. In a government of
295. Ibid.
296. See text supra at note 187.
297. U.S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. I. The Philadelphia's mayor's court in 1797 recognized
the difference between the two styles of reasoning and thus distinguished both Henfield
and Ravara. Commonwealth v. Schaffer, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at xxxi Appendix.
298. United States v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas. 774, 775-76 (1798).
299. Ibid. at 776.
300.
It may be urged, that though the offence is not specified in the constitution, nor
defined in any act of congress; yet, that it is an offence at common law; and that
the common law is the law of the United States, in cases that arise under their
authority. The nature of our federal compact will not, however, tolerate this
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delegated powers, he argued, all powers must arise by a positive grant. Thus
Congress could punish counterfeiting, offenses against the law of nations
and other offenses under the necessary and proper clause. 301 Then, accepting Wiscart, he maintained that even powers granted expressly 'cannot take
effect until they are exercised through the medium of a law' . 302 He
characterized Henfield3 03 as a prosecution for treaty violations, and noted
that in Ravara304 the accused's consular status required federal jurisdiction. 305
Rawle, as prosecutor, effectively refuted Dallas's arguments. He maintained that Henfield also concerned the law of nations. Moreover, neither the
treaties nor Congress had defined the punishment for infractions of the
treaty. 306 Nor could Ravara be distinguished so easily, since Rawle thought
Congress had not defined the offense nor apportioned the punishment. 307
Rawle thus demonstrated that Dallas could not distinguish previous cases
sufficiently to require prior congressional definition of crimes and punishments.
Rawle based the prosecution on federal common law. Since Congress had
established the office of Commissioner of the Revenue, attempted corruption of that officer justified prosecution, even without prior congressional
definition. Since Worrall could not have attempted the bribe had Congress
not created the office, such an attempt was a case arising under the laws of
the United States. Prosecution would proceed under the principles of the
common law or else the attempt could not be punished at all. 308 In a strict
doctrine. The twelfth article of the amendment stipulates, that 'the powers not
delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states,
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people'. In relation to crimes and
punishments the objects of the delegated power of the United States are
enumerated and fixed .... [T]he very powers that are granted cannot take effect
until they are exercised through the medium of a law.
Ibid. at 777.
The reference to the tenth amendment as the twelfth article of the amendments
derives from the fact that twelve amendments were submitted to the states, the first two
of which were rejected. The tenth amendment was thus the twelfth provision in the list
submitted to the states for ratification.
301. Ibid. at 776-77.
302. See note 301 supra.
303. See text at note 170 supra.
304. See text at notes 216-19 supra.
305. 28 F. Cas. at 778.
306. Ibid.
307. Ibid.
308.
[T]he offence was strictly within the very terms of the constitution, arising under
the laws of the United States. If no such office had been created by the laws of the
United States, no attempt to corrupt such an officer could have been made; and it
is unreasonable to insist, that merely because a law has not prescribed an express
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sense, that is probably true. State courts could not prosecute for attempted
bribery of United States officials as such, although they could prosecute
under a different definition of the same act. Rawle's main point, however,
was that, if Coxe would have been liable for accepting the bribe, then the
party offering the bribe must be similarly liable. 309 The logic is not obvious.
Coxe was a federal officer, 310 but Worrall had undertaken no obligation to
the federal government. Nevertheless, even after Justice Chase's query,
Rawle based the indictment only on the common law, deriving jurisdiction
for the case as one arising under United States law. 311
Chase ruled immediately that an indictment solely at common law was not
sustainable. The exercise of federal jurisdiction required Congress to define
both the crime and the punishment. He denied the existence of a federal
common law of crime, 312 but did not express an opinion on the law of
and appropriate punishment for the offence, therefore, the offence, when committed, shall not be punished by the circuit court, upon the principles of common
law punishment . . . .
Ibid. at 778.
District Judge Kane gives a later and different view of the situation.
The jurisdiction of offences which are cognizable at common law resides in the
state courts alone, even though the general government may be the pa1ty
immediately aggrieved by the misdeed complained of. Until the year 1840 the
congress of the United States seem to have been, in general, content with the
protection, which the laws of the several states gave to the public property within
their limits. The integrity of subordinates, who were not themselves entrusted with
public money ... was guarded of course by the common law and the local statutes,
as administered by the state courts.
United States v. Hutchinson, 26 F. Cas. 452, 453 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1848)(No. 15,432).
309.
The true point of view for considering the case, may be ascertained, by an inquiry
whether, if Mr. Coxe had accepted the bribe, and betrayed his trust, he would not
have been indictable in the courts of the United States? If he would be so
indictable, upon the strongest principles of analogy, the offence of the person who
tempted him, must be equally the subject of animadversion before the same
judicial authority.
28 F. Cas. at 778.
310. Ibid. at 775.
311.
CHASE, Circuit Justice. Do you mean, Mr. Attorney, to support this indictment
solely at common law? If you do, I have no difficulty upon the subject. The
indictment cannot be maintained in this court.
Mr. Rawle, answering in the affirmative, CHASE, Circuit Justice, stopped Mr.
Levy, who was about to reply, in support of the motion in arrest of judgment.
Ibid. at 778.
312. Ibid. at 779. '[l)n my opinion, the United States, as a federal government, have no
common law.'
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nations. 313 Chase indicated that even a congressionally defined offense that
omitted fixing the penalty would be insufficient. 314 Chase's radical opinion
elicited a similarly radical response from Justice Peters. Peters made the
classic argument for common law crimes: that every government has the
power to protect itself from subversion. 315 He thought the federal government
possessed the common law power to punish misdemeanors. The necessary
independence of the federal government made reliance on state courts to
punish offenders inappropriate. His argument was faulty, because such reliance on the states was one appropriate option under the Constitution.3 16
Chase and Peters were dealing explicitly with a federal common law of
crime: a new issue. Prior to Worrall judges had used the common law, with
easy reference to state law as the rule of decision. 317 Chase explicated the
differences between various states' common laws, 318 concluding that any
federal resort to common law would thus have to be to English common law
as such, then altered for United States conditions. 319 Chase demanded
statutory definition; he rejected state law as the rule of decision and the
inconsistent federal law that entailed. But his analysis created tenth
amendment3 20 problems. Peters disagreed, similarly rejecting state law but
accepting a federal common law. Analysis before Wiscart could have
313. Ibid.
314. 28 F. Cas. at 779.
315.
Whenever a government has been established, I have always supposed, that a
power to preserve itself, was a necessary and an inseparable concomitant.
Ibid.
316. Robert C. Palmer, 'Liberties', supra note I.
317. See text at notes 171-87 supra.
318.
[H]e who shall· travel through the different states, will soon discover, that the
whole of the common law of England has been nowhere introduced; that some
states have rejected what others have adopted; and that there is, in short, a great
and essential diversity in the subjects to which the common law is applied, as well
as in the extent of its application.
Ibid. at 779.
The observation is one which would derive experientially for a federal justice
accustomed to riding circuit. The nature of the observation, however, was still
somewhat novel. Morton J. Horwitz, Transformation, supra note 12 at 11-14; William
E. Nelson, 'The American Revolution and the Emergence of Modern Doctrines of
Federalism and Conflict of Laws', in Law in Colonial Massachusetts (Boston, 1984)
432,451-54.
319. 28 F. Cas. at 779.
2264-265 (1797).

Dallas later carefully followed Chase's argument. 8 Annals

320. U.S. Const. Amend X. The problems concern jurisdictions like that over consuls, who
were not public ministers. Exercising that constitutional jurisdiction without aid of the
common law, federal or state, required legislation. But Congress had no legislative
authority in that sphere. Chase's analysis thus logically implied the congressional
exercise of undelegated legislative powers.
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allowed prosecutions under the law of nations but condemned the counterfeiting and corruption prosecutions. Wiscart, in concentrating attention on
federal statutes for carrying jurisdiction into effect, excluded resort to state
law as the rule of decision in federal criminal cases.
The court wanted this new issue put into a form suitable for final
resolution before the Supreme Court. 321 Defense counsel, however, were
unwilling: they 'did not think themselves authorized to enter into a
compromise of that nature'. 322 They did not specify the nature of the
compromise. Perhaps that resolution would have required an agreed upon
statement of facts, and Worrall preferred conviction to an admission of guilt.
But 'compromise' would then have been a strange word to have u.sed.
Perhaps the compromise did not involve the accused, but the law. Dalla~: had
justified Henfield and Ravara. For resolution by the Supreme Court, he
would have to discard his legal stance. Either he or Worrall may have
preferred losing to what might happen in the Supreme Court. Chase's
decision to concur with Peters sufficiently to impose the common law
penalty on Worrall is thus explicable. 323 From Chase's point of view, altered
by Wiscart, acknowledging Henfield would legitimize the Worrall prosecution. Chase merely left Worrall to his preferred fate.
Worrall is identified as a watershed for Chase. 324 In 1799 Chase presided
over a counterfeiting trial: United States v. Sylvester. 325 The case is
unreported, but is said to have been a common law prosecution for
counterfeiting resulting in the common law penalties of imprisonment and
fine. 326 Chase's acquiescence to common law convictions in Worrall and
Sylvester might indicate acceptance of a federal common law of crime. 327 As
already shown, however, Worrall need not indicate that. 328 And Sylvester
can be explained in other ways. If the prosecution relied on Greenleof, 329

321. 28 F. Cas. at 780.
322. Ibid.
323. The traditional explanation is that Chase conferred with his fellow Supreme Court
justices and found they agreed with Peters. Chase then changed his mind. Ibid. at
780n.; Stephen B. Presser, 'Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 68-69. That
explanation, however, does not account for the 'compromise' into which the lawyers
were unwilling to enter.
324. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 69. Note, however, that
Johnson does not assume that Chase's views had altered at all. George Lee Haskins and
Herbert A. Johnson, Hist. S.C., supra note 12 at 639.
325. See Leonard Levy, Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History: Legacy
of Suppression (New York, 1963) xv-xvi.
326. Ibid.
327. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 69; Leonard Levy,
Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 278.
328. See text at notes 321-23 supra.
329. See text at notes 244-52 supra.
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Chase still would not have believed in a merely inherent federal common
law of crime. Procedure according to Greenleaf was founded on an
extrapolation from a statute. The extrapolation was tenuous, but the
prosecution was not based solely on inherent common law authority.
Peters's view did not prevail, even in the short term. 330

D. Turner
In 1799 Ellsworth and Chase reiterated Wiscart doctrine: statutes were
needed to exercise constitutionally allowed jurisdictions. 331 Turner v. Bank
of North America 332 concerned diversity jurisdiction over an action on an
endorsed promissory note. The issue was whether an endorsement to a
citizen of another state would yield diversity, when the citizenship of the
original parties to the note would not. 333 The Constitution indicated that
diversity might result. 3 3 4 The Judiciary Act specified that it did not. m
Rawle argued the self-executing nature of the Constitution. Since the
Constitution granted the judicial power
Congress can no more limit, than enlarge, the constitutional grant. In the second section
of the third article, the constitution contemplates the parties to the controversy, as alone
raising the question of jurisdiction; and if the existing controversy is 'between the
citizens of different states', the judicial power of the United States expressly extends to
it.336

For Rawle, the Article III §2 specification that the judicial power 'shall
extend' to various matters was effective.

330. Historical opinion would have indicated that Peters's view did prevail. Stephen B.
Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 68-70; Leonard Levy, Emergence of
a Free Press, supra note 12 at 278. In United States v. Williams, Ellsworth did
comment that 'the common law of this country remains the same as it was before the
Revolution'. 29 F. Cas. 130 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799)(No. 17,708). Williams, however,
was similar to Henfield, except that the accused had officially, but without U.S.
consent, become a French citizen prior to engaging in warfare. Williams also raised his
expatriation as a defense, so that the use of a common law standard is rather different
here from using the common law as a source of jurisdiction. Leonard Levy cites
Williams as if it were relevant to seditious libel. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free
Press, supra note 12 at 277.
331. See text at notes 282-85 supra.
332. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799). Turner, not Wiscart, is normally cited as the origin of the
doctrine. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 439, 449 (1850).
333. Turner, 4 U.S. at II.
334. Controversies 'between Citizens of different States' would on its face include controversies between an original party and an endorsee of a different state. U.S.
Const. Art. III, §2, cl. I.
335. Act. of Sept. 24,1789, ch. 20, §II.
336. 4 U.S. at 10.
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Ellsworth preferred prior statutory authorization, and queried Rawk on
the impact of his argument. 337 Chase was even more explicit.
Chase, Justice. The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal courts derive
their judicial power immediately from the constitution; but the political truth is, that the
disposal of the judicial power (except in a few specified instances) belongs to Congress.
If Congress has given the power to this court, we possess it, not otherwise; and if
Congress has not given the power to us, or to any other court, it still remains at the
legislative disposal. Besides, Congress is not bound, and it would, perhaps, be
inexpedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts, to every subject, in every
form, which the constitution might warrant. 338

Neither Ellsworth nor Chase advocated a federal common law. They both
showed much more deference to the legislative branch.339

E. The Alien and Sedition Acts
In 1798, after two seditious libel prosecutions had been initiated at
common law, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts. 34° Creating
distrust of the federal government thus became a criminal offense. The
Federalists used the Sedition Act to attack congressmen and newspapers in
Republican states. 341 Both the Republicans 342 and some states 343 protested.

337. 'How far is it meant to carry this argument? Will it be affirmed, that in every ca.se, to
which the judicial power of the United States extends, the federal courts may exercise
a jurisdiction, without the intervention of the Legislature, to distribute, and regulat1:,
the power?' 4 U.S. at JOn. The problem Ellsworth raises is real, but so likewise is the
problem that Gerry raised. See note 261 supra. It could easily be argued that the
independence of the judiciary and its balancing function demanded that all the
jurisdiction possible via the Constitution be located in some federal court, and that that
principle would supersede the separation of powers concerns. Congress cou!d, of
course, then regulate if it was dissatisfied.
338. 4 U.S. at JOn.
339. Ellsworth was one of the principal drafters of the Judiciary Act. Clark Warren, 'New
Light', supra note 12 at 50. It is completely possible that the original version of H9 and
II, including the limiting clause 'and defined by the laws of the same' was his work,
but defeated in passage. As justice he would then be seen as insisting on the prior action
of Congress once more. Paterson, however, was also one of the principal drafters. Ibid.
He had sided with Wilson in Wiscart, so that one would expect that he was not as
deferential to the legislative branch. See text at note 262 supra.
340. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, I Stats. 596.
341. George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Hist. S.C., supra note 12 at 638-39.
342. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 280; James Morton Smith,
Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca,
1956).
343. 'Instructions from the General Assembly of Virginia to the Senators from that Slate in
Congress, January II th, 1800', reprinted in PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra
note 190 at 225-26.
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The prosecutions created widespread distrust of the Federalists and were a
significant factor in Jefferson's election. 344 The public response to governmental suppression of criticism made it difficult to argue later in favor of a
federal common law of crime.345
The common law prosecutions for seditious libel that preceded the
Sedition Act are obscure. Neither prosecution resulted in a trial. Benjamin
Franklin Bache, editor of the Aurora, died; Burke, editor of the Time Piece,
fled the country. 346 Peters's well-known comments in Worrall make it likely
that the prosecutions were founded on a federal common law of crime. 347
The prosecution of Bache at least might have succeeded, since Peters would
have been the judge.348
Congress was dissatisfied with such common law prosecutions. They
passed the Sedition Act not simply to alter common law rules, 349 but to
satisfy the justices with a statute. Wiscart doctrine determined that proper
common law jurisdiction would not find favor with most of the Supreme
Court. Ellsworth and Chase were still certainly of that opinion in August of
1799, when they queried Rawle in Turner. 350 The emphasis on basing
jurisdiction on laws of the United States, thus on statutory authority, had
reached Congress; Marshall argued against such ideas in Congress.35I The
statute was necessary not just to modify the role of the jury and add truth as
a defense, but to prosecute successfully. The prosecutions of Bache and
Burke may, indeed, have only been harassment, useful until the statute was
passed. 352
The passage of the statute allayed the court's legal qualms. They found
first amendment freedom of speech and press no problem. The alterations
of state constitutions353 and the consistency of state practice provided a
model that many found attractive. 354 Moreover, Worrall had involved the

344. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 97, 104-105.
345. George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Hist. S.C., supra note 12 at 638-41.
346. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 277.
347. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 632-33.
348. Ibid. at 632; Leonard Levy, 'On the Origins of the Press Clause', supra note 12 at 205,
217.
349. Ibid. at 634-35. Leonard Levy remains perplexed by the felt need for a statute, thinking
the common law would suffice. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note
12 at 298.
350. Turner v. Bank of America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at IOn.
351. 10 Annals 614 (1799).
352. A similar situation seems to have arisen under Jefferson: Leonard Levy, Emergence of
a Free Press, supra note 12 at 343-46.
353. See text at note 274 supra.
354. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 304-305.
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need of a statute. 355 Regardless of the Judiciary Act and its deference to state
law, 356 theory now emphasized the independence of the federal government
and the desirability of uniform federal practice. Both concerns indicated a
preference for federal instead of state law, and Wiscart demanded statutory
instead of common law jurisdictions.357
United States v. Hudson and Goodwin 358 in 1812 carried these demands
to their natural conclusion: there was no federal common law of crime. The
court formulated the rule in the broadest possible language. Hudson was a
seditious libel prosecution. Against Justice Story's continued objections, the
court thereafter applied the rule also in admiralty and maritime jurisdictions.359 Story's argument was overly expansive, since he would have
included all offenses against the sovereign and against public rights, justice,
peace, trade and police, 360 without considering first amendment implications. But as to the main point, he was correct. The Judiciary Act had not
delegated jurisdiction only over specifically defined offenses.36I Moreover,
the language of Article I, §8, cl. 10 indicated what Marshall had argued in
1799: 362 that Congress could modify the law of nations, but need not
legislate it entirely before court enforcement.

355. See text at notes 312-20 supra.
356. See text note 62 supra.
357. See text at notes 253-67 supra.
358. II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32.
359. Story already was involved between 1812 and 1816 with federal common law. In
United States v. Clark he felt bound by but protested the decision in Hudson, ruling that
that case precluded a federal common law relative to perjury. 25 F. Cas. 441 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1813)(No. 14,804). In United States v. Coolidge he argued from the Judiciary
Act§ II, as would Charles Warren ('New Light', supra note 12 at 73), that Congress
had not restricted the courts to specifically defined offences. 25 F. Cas. 619 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1813)(No. 14,857). He argued there that admiralty matters presented the
strongest case for a federal common law. Ibid. at 620. He was correct at least in that.
Story's opinion there was reversed by the Supreme Court without argument although
the court was divided; the government declined to argue the case and no counsel
appeared for the defendant. 14 U.S. (I Wheaton) 415, 416. In 1812 Story voiced his
opinion (following Tilghman in United States v. Conyngham: 25 F. Cas. 599 (C.C.D.
Pa. 180I)(No. 14,850)) concerning §34 in non-criminal matters. United States v.
Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812)(No. 16,750). Story was, even for
himself, abnormally prescient in Wonson, since the report has him citing, in 1812, his
1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson (41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842)). Ibid. at 749. Modt::rn
justices have prudently abstained from this practice. Story reiterated his opinion at
length then in United States v. Hoar. 26 F. Cas. 329 (C.C.D. Mass. 182I)(No.
15,373).
360. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. at 620.
361. See note 359 supra and text at notes 49-61 supra.
362. Sec note 64 supra.

Symposium: Federal Common Law of Crime

323

VII. Conclusion
Historical optmon has held that Congress and the first generation of
justices believed in a federal common law of crime. The most typical
expression of the common law of crime was seditious libel. Such an
acceptance of common law authority dictated that expansive notions of first
amendment freedoms of speech and press could not rest on original intent,
because the First Congress as the body that drafted the first amendment and
the first judges approved by that Congress must be presumed to have acted
and thought in line with the measures they proposed. That scholarly tradition
has obscured the early consensus on the limited nature of the federal
government.
Careful examination of the Judiciary Act and the early cases yields a
different picture. The Judiciary Act did not envisage a general federal
common law of crime. Although not explicit, the Judiciary Act had
delegated to the federal courts a jurisdiction over offenses under admiralty
and maritime law according to the law of nations. The justiCes had no
problem perceiving that intent and applied state law as the rule of decision
in such criminal cases except when otherwise mandated by Constitution,
statute, or treaty. No evidence survives of an expansive notion of common
law jurisdiction among the justices prior to Wiscart.
Wiscart called into question early ideas of a self-executing jurisdiction.
Except perhaps for the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, jurisdiction must be established by statute. An independent federal common law
was thus problematic. In Worrall, Justice Chase posed the additional
problem squarely as to the precise rules to be adopted. As between state and
federal common law, consistency dictated the latter; but Wiscart doctrine
rejected that possibility. Application of state criminal common law in the
Worrall situation would have been inappropriate anyway, since it was
outside the admiralty and maritime subject matter: §9 and § 11 of the
Judiciary Act were an insufficient foundation. But the Wiscart emphasis on
statutes necessitated the passage of the Sedition Act instead of permitting
common law prosecutions. Hudson was thus a foregone conclusion;
Coolidge, relating to admiralty law, was not.
Within the first decade after ratification of the Constitution, some
legislators and some justices believed in federal jurisdiction over offenses
not previously defined by statute. Few of those, however, advocated a
general federal common law of crime. Even Peters's remarks came after
Wiscart and do not indicate the views of legislators or justices before 1796.
Analysis of first amendment speech and press can proceed without the
vexation of the supposed initial acceptance of a federal common law of
crime. Moreover, this perception of early legislative and judicial views
confirms that at least at the beginning there was a strong consensus in the
government that the federal government was different in kind from state
governments and had a more limited mandate.

